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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j), as amended, 1990.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court erred in not reinstating its
October 27, 1989, Extraordinary Writ and Order which compelled
all Appellees to grant and otherwise resolve the issues presented
in Appellants1 Requests for Agency Review.

(See Exhibits "B",

"C n , "E", "U", and "V", Appendix hereto.)
2.

Whether Appellants had the right to seek and obtain

an Extraordinary Writ and Order under Rule 65B from the district
court —

one which should not have later been secretly set aside

under Rule 7(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, without either
notice to Appellants or an opportunity to be heard.

(Exhibit

"R", App. hereto.)
3. Whether a Utah district court has the power and
authority to compel the Securities Division, a Utah government
agency, to abide by its own agency rules and the UAPA.
4.

Whether Appellees committed contempt of the district

court by ignoring its Extraordinary Writ and Order on October 30,
1989, and hurriedly issuing an Order on Agency Review in
violation thereof.

If so, whether there is any relief or remedy

presently available to Appellants for Appellees' contempt of the
district court.

(See Exhibits "E" and "H", App. hereto.)
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5. Whether it is Constitutional for Securities Division
Director John C. Baldwin to exercise investigatory and
prosecutorial powers and, at the same, render judicial functions
(as "presiding officer") by unilaterally, arbitrarily, hastily,
and capriciously denying, on October 30, 1989, Appellants'
Requests for Agency Review under §12, UAPA.
"0", "H" and "I", Appendix hereto.)

(See Exhibits "D",

If such is unconstitutional,

whether the district court erred in not dismissing the Division's
amended petitions.
6.

(See Exhibit "S", App. hereto.)

Whether the Securities Advisory Board, which was not

engaged in investigatory and prosecutorial functions like
Appellee Baldwin, should have acted as the "presiding officer"
under §12 of the UAPA as opposed to Appellee Baldwin alone. In
other words, did Baldwin (or the Division) commit contempt of the
district court or otherwise violate the lower court's Writ and
Order by unilaterally acting as "presiding officer" on October
30, 1989.
7.

(See Exhibits "E", "F", and "H", App. hereto.)
Whether §12 of the UAPA only contemplates "final

agency action" as specifically provided in §14 of the UAPA,
especially when neither §12 nor the corollary rule say such on
their face. Whether §12 is identical to §14, UAPA, and therefore
statutorily superfluous.
8. Whether Appellants have any remedy or relief
presently available to them for the Appellees1 violations of §12,
UAPA, and the Department of Commerce corollary rule.
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Whether it is Constitutional for Appellee Baldwin to

continue to act as judge (i.e., agency director and "presiding
officer") for purposes of reviewing any "final agency action" in
this case.

In other words, whether it is just and fair for

"presiding officer" Baldwin to "sign off" on, modify, or approve
the ultimate findings of the Securities Advisory Board in the ongoing administrative adjudicative proceedings. Whether someone
unbiased and impartial (i.e., someone other than any of the
Appellees) should act as "presiding officer" in the
administrative adjudicative proceedings after October 30, 1989.
10.

Whether it is inherently prejudicial or

unconstitutional for the prosecutor, the judge(s), jury, and
executioners to be represented by the same counsel (i.e., the
Attorney General) at the same time in the same administrative
proceeding.

If so, whether there is any remedy or relief

presently available to Appellants for such blatant conflict of
interest.
11.

Whether the Utah Securities Division has power and

authority to enforce regulation against Appellants which is
diametrically inconsistent with existing federal law,
specifically, Appellants' contrary legal obligations under
Article III, §1, NASD Rules of Fair Practice.

(See Exhibits "K",

"L", and "P", App. hereto.) Whether the NASD Rules of Fair
Practice, in light of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-27, preempt Utah Code
Ann. §61-l-6(l)(g) under the highly unusual facts and
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circumstances of this case.

If so, whether the administrative

adjudicate proceedings should be dismissed in their entirety.
A.

Standard of Review.

The standard of review for each

of the foregoing issues is simply whether the district court
incorrectly applied the law or otherwise abused its discretion.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The due process provisions of the federal Constitution
and the Constitution of the State of Utah, are determinative of
this case.

Specific reference is also made to the U.S. Supreme

Court case of Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 43 L.Ed.2d 712, 95
S.Ct. 1456 (1975), a significant administrative law decision
which does not appear to have been cited in any previous Utah
decision.

This case also involves issues of federal preemption

and reference is made to Point IV below, including this Court's
decision in Western Capital & Securities, Inc. v. Kundsvig, 779
P.2d 688, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, (Ut. Ct. of App. February 7,
1989) [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep.(CCH) 194,337.
Finally, Appellee Baldwin and the Attorney General's inherent
(and continuing) conflicts of interest in the administrative
proceedings relating to this appeal are issues having
Constitutional implications.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(a) Nature of the case. This case is one of first
impression in Utah; it involves an interpretation of Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-12 (the "UAPA") and the corollary rule promulgated
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by the Department of Commerce.

It further involves a

determination as to whether Appellantsf Constitutional rights
were and are being violated by Appellees, thereby justifying
complete dismissal of the administrative adjudicative
proceedings.

This case also involves a determination as to

whether Appellees' violation of §12, UAPA, have prejudiced and
otherwise violated Appellants' Constitutional rights to the
extent of further justifying either dismissal of the existing
administrative adjudicative proceedings or other comparable
relief such as a new administrative trial before impartial
judges.
The Appellees have also raised issues as to whether the
district court has jurisdiction to have heard Appellants'
Petition for Extraordinary Writ. Thus, an additional issue is
whether the district court erred in deciding —
fact —

after the

that it lacked jurisdiction to compel Appellees not to

act capriciously and arbitrarily with respect to Appellants.
Finally, the most significant issue in these proceedings is
whether the Division has jurisdiction to have brought the
administrative adjudicative proceedings at all —

proceedings

entirely inconsistent, on their face, with Appellants' federal
obligations under Art. Ill, §1 of the NASD Rules of Fair
Practice.

(See Exhibits "J", "K", and "S", App. hereto.)
(b) Course of proceedings. Based on the district

court's failure to reinstate its October 27, 1989, Extraordinary
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Writ and Order, the administrative adjudicative proceedings have
continued in violation of Appellants' Constitutional rights. 1
For example, on July 16, 1990, after nearly 1% years of
relentless litigation, an administrat ive trial was held before
the Securities Advisory Board.

No ruling as a result of such

hearing has been rendered to date.

Yet the continuation of such

administrative adjudicative proceedings after October 27, 1989,
has been at great and substantial expense and damage to
Appellants and had the district court and the ALJ not erred, such
unlawful proceedings would not have continued.
RELEVANT FACTS
In April 1989, the Utah Division of Securities
("Division") filed administrative adjudicative proceedings
against Appellants seeking to revoke or suspend their securities
brokerage licenses under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6.

Such petitions

were amended by the Division in July 1989 to delete one of three
causes of action alleged against Appellants.

In December 1989,

the ALJ, in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion of Appellants,
dismissed Count II of such amended petitions, a Division
allegation that Appellants f conduct violated so-called
"suitability rules."

This resulted in the amended petitions only

stating a claim against Appellants for alleged "dishonest or
unethical practices" under §61-1-6(1)(g).

(Exhibits "M" and " S " ,

l"Th1s naturally Includes Appellants' Constitutional rights under the Commerce Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, Art. I, §8(3) and §8(18).
-6-

App. hereto.)

In the amended petitions the Division alleges that

simply buying securities from persons who lacked Utah exemptions
from registration (no matter what the purpose) was a "dishonest
or unethical practice" on the part of the buyers (i.e.,
Respondents).

Because the Division's proceedings are legally and

logically inconsistent with Appellants1 Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") obligations under the Securities Exchange
Act of 19 34 and, because such are further inconsistent with a
previous February 28, 1989, Order of U.S. District Judge J.
Thomas Greene compelling Appellants to honor outstanding NASD
contracts [R. 63; page 4, 110, Exhibit "T" and R. 33-34; p. 8-9,
I's 15 and 16, Exhibit "J", App. hereto], Appellants filed a Rule
12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss the Division's amended petitions. In
such Motion, Appellants argued before the ALJ that the Division
lacked jurisdiction to discipline them simply for complying with
their obligations under federal law.

Specifically, Appellants

argued that the Division's amended petitions were repugnant to
federal securities law as exclusively reserved to District Courts
of the United States under §27 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa.

In other words, Article III, §1 of the

NASD Rules of Fair Practice — which are, in turn, exclusively
governed under §19(c) of the Exchange Act [Exhibit "K",
App. hereto] — compels a broker-dealer to honor trades, whereas
the Division's amended petitions sought to discipline
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Appellants —

at the same time — merely for honoring the very

same trades.

(See In re: Shaskan & Co., Inc., SEC Docket 775

(May 28, 1976) and Friedman & Co., 45 SEC 393 (1973), both
holding that broker-dealers can be disciplined and their licenses
revoked under the NASD Rules of Fair Practice for failing to
honor trades.)

Simply put, the Division sought to discipline

Appellants for doing something they were required to do under
federal law (i.e., honoring outstanding NASD contracts previously
entered into in interstate commerce with fellow out-of-state NASD
member securities broker-dealers).
App. hereto.)

(See Exhibit "J" and "Q",

As a result, Appellants are now being severely

punished and otherwise placed in the impossible position of
having had to comply at the same time with antithetical and
diametrically conflicting regulation on the part of the NASD, on
the one hand, and the Division, on the other.
added.]

[Emphasis

Significantly, this preemption principle (i.e., that

federal securities law supersedes state blue sky law (more
especially with respect to broker-dealer regulation)) is
specifically incorporated into Utah law in Utah Code
Arm. §61-1-27.

(See Exhibit "N", App. hereto.)

This statute

requires that the Utah Uniform Securities Act be interpreted in
uniformity and consistently with federal law, of which the NASD
Rules of Fair Practice necessarily have the same force and
effect.

(See, e.cj. , Exhibit "L", App. hereto and this Court's

decision in Western Capital, supra.) With regard to this
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argument,

specific

reference

is made to pages 28-36 of

the

Record, Appellants 1 "Statement of Material Facts" in t h e i r Brief
Supporting Agency Review, 2 (Exhibit «j«, App. h e r e t o . )
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denied Appellants 1
R\ale 12(b)(1) Motion on August 29, 1989.
App. hereto.)

(R. 72-76; Exhibit "A",

As a r e s u l t , on September 11, 1989, pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, including the corollary Department of
Commerce Rule, Appellants timely filed a Request for Agency
Review of t h a t order.

(R. 8-12; Exhibit "B", App. hereto.)

Appellants further f i l e d , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , a Request for
Certification
action".

of the ALJ's August 2$f Order as a "final

agency

(R. 19-20; Exhibit "C", App. h e r e t o . ) Obviously, i f the

Division e i t h e r lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n or i t s action i s preempted as
contemplated in Western Capital, th^re i s no l e g a l basis for the
existence of such administrative adjudicative proceedings.

Thus,

Appellants' §12, UAPA, Request for Agency Review and a l t e r n a t i v e
Request for C e r t i f i c a t i o n were more than reasonable under the
circumstances.
Between September 11, and October 27, 1989, P e t i t i o n e r s
h^ard nothing from the Division r e l a t i v e to such Requests as
s p e c i f i c a l l y reguired of the Division under Department of

Reference is further made to Exhibits "P" and "Q", Appendix hereto, copies of pertinent parts
of §15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which exclusively governs self-regulatory
securities organizations such as the NASD and, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-7920, July
19, 1966, 31 F.R. 10076, an SEC policy statement permitting consummation of securities
transactions by broker-dealers when trading in a security Is suspended. This latter authority
further confirms that the Division's amended petitions are Inconsistent on their face with
federal law and policy. See Point IV below.
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Commerce R151-46b-12.

(R. 139, 163, 193-194; Exhibit "D", App.

hereto.) Because an Order on Review was never issued as required
under the Rule, Appellants, on October 27, 1989, filed an Ex
Parte Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the Third Judicial
District Court and obtained, on that same date, an Extraordinary
Writ and Order directing the Respondents/Appellees to comply with
the Division's own rules and either (1) grant the Appellants'
Request for Agency Review and resolve all issues therein, oj: (2)
certify the ALJ's August 29, 1989, Order as a "final agency
action".

(R. 91-92; Exhibit "E", App. hereto.)

Such Order and

Writ were served on each Appellee named herein no later than
October 30, 1989, and in fact, 4 of the 5 Appellee/Securities
Advisory Board Members were served by hand-delivery on October
27, 1989.

(R. 93-94; Exhibit "F", App. hereto.)
On November 1, 1989, Appellees -- in apparent reliance

on Rule 7(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure —

secretly filed

their own Ex Parte Counter-Petition with the district court and,
without any notice to Appellants or their counsel, secretly
induced the district court ex parte (and for reasons wholly
unknown) to set aside its previously-entered Writ and Order of
October 27, 1989.

(R. 103-104; Exhibit "G", App. h e r e t o , ) 3

The

Apppellees' Counter-Petition, was then served on Appellants 1

^This gives rise to another issue: If the Securities Advisory Board is and would be acting as
Appellants' judge and jury after October 30, 1989 — which they did on July 16, 1990 -- how can
the Securities Advisory Board members, in light of what has occurred herein, be able to act as
impartial judges and jurors?
-10-

counsel the following day, namely, November 2, or, six (6) days
after 4 of the named-Appellees were personally served with the
district court's Writ and Order.

In such Ex Parte

Counter-Petition, Appellees boldly argue that the district court
lacks jurisdiction to force Appellees to comply with the very
rules governing the Division.

(R. 105-112.) As per such Ex

Parte Counter-Petition, the Appellees further acknowledge that
they received and were all on actual notice of the district
courtfs October 27, 1989, Extraordinary Writ and Order by as
early as October 30, 1989. Furthermore, the Appellees admit that
on October 30, Appellee Baldwin, as "presiding officer" and in
contempt of the same Writ and Order, hurriedly fashioned an Order
On Agency Review dated October 30, 1989, an Order which
unilaterally denied Appellants' Requests in all particulars.
(R. 114-118, Ex. "H", App. hereto.)

It is thus undisputed that

the Appellees not only violated the district court's Order and
Writ of October 27, but it is further undisputed that the
Appellee Baldwin unilaterally deprived the entire Securities
Advisory Board, certain named-Appellees herein, from
participating in Baldwin's unilateral, arbitrary and capricious
decision, all of which was contemptuous of the district court's
October 27, Order and Writ compelling the contrary.

(Exhibit

"E", App. hereto.) It is thus further undisputed that Appellee
Baldwin acted, has acted and will continue to act as "presiding
officer", prosecutor, investigator, judge, jury and executioner
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relative to the administrative proceedings direly affecting
Appellants' livelihoods.

This is because Mr. Baldwin not only

signed the Order on Agency Review (acting as judge) but he also
personally signed the Division's Motion to Convert the
administrative proceedings from informal to formal (thereby also
acting as prosecutor).

(See Exhibits "H" and "I" in Appendix

hereto, copies of Mr. Baldwin's remarkably convenient albeit
contemptuous October 30, 1989, Order on Agency Review and his own
Motion to Convert filed in the administrative adjudicative
proceedings, respectively.) The foregoing is also not to ignore
that Division Director Baldwin will continue to act as "presiding
officer" (judge) in the remaining disposition of the
administrative adjudicative proceedings.

(See Exhibit "0", App.

hereto.)
On November 2, 1989, Appellants, as petitioners in the
district court action, having had the rug surreptitiously pulled
out from under them, filed a Motion to Reinstate the district
court's October 27, 1989, Extraordinary Writ and Order.
(R. 144-145; Exhibit "U", App. hereto.)

For reasons completely

unknown, such was denied by the district court on January 23,
1990.

It can thus only be assumed that the district court denied

Appellants' Motion to Reinstate because it subscribed to
Appellees' erroneous argument that it lacks jurisdiction to have
issued the October 27, Extraordinary Writ and Order in the first
instance.

On February 15, 1990, the district court certified its
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January 23, 1990, ruling for appeal under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, and this appeal has ensued.

(R. 201-202;

Exhibit "V", App. hereto.)
Based on the Appellees1 intentional failure to honor the
district court's Writ and Order, including Director Baldwin's
obvious bias, conflict of interest, and failure to abide by his
agency's own administrative rules, the administrative proceedings
which pertain to this appeal have remained on-going for well over
one (1) year at great and unjustified expense and damage to
Appellants and their business and reputations.

In fact, as a

result of such unlawful and vicious proceedings, Appellant
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. has lost substantial income and has
recently filed the necessary state and federal broker-dealer
withdrawal forms ("BDW Forms") to cease doing business as a
securities broker-dealer.

As a direct consequence of the

Division's amended petitions and the endless administrative
adjudicative proceedings initiated by the Division to destroy it,
Johnson-Bowles is now out-of-business.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Reference is made to Appellants1 Conclusion below.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT HAS POWER AND AUTHORITY TO
HAVE ISSUED THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND ORDER OF
OCTOBER 27, 1989, AND IT FURTHER HAS POWER AND
AUTHORITY TO COMPEL A STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
TO ABIDE BY ITS OWN RULES, INCLUDING THE UAPA.
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The lower court erroneously determined that under Rule
65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the UAPA, it lacks
jurisdiction to have issued its Extraordinary Writ and Order on
October 27, 1989.
App. hereto.)

(See Exhibits "D", "0", "R", "G", and "V",

This is not the law:

The Utah Division of

Securities is clearly an inferior tribunal or board of the Third
Judicial District Court.

Furthermore, there can be no dispute

that the Division's director or its officers exercise judicial
functions as contemplated in Rule 65B. Were the Division and its
officers not engaged in judicial functions, both the on-going
administrative adjudicative proceedings presently undertaken
against Appellants and this very appeal would not exist. The
Appellees unfortunately convinced the lower court that the
Securities Division is only subject to direct regulation by the
Utah Court of Appeals and that a Utah court of general
jurisdiction has no authority or power ov€>r it in any respect or
capacity.

(R. 153-161.)

The Division's arrogant and brazen

belief is exemplified by the fact that it admits notice of the
district court's October 27, 1989, Extraordinary Writ and Order,
only to have had Appellee Baldwin hurriedly "hammer out" an
October 30, Order on Agency Review in complete contempt thereof
and only in an effort to fraudulently and disingenuously render
the district court's Extraordinary Writ and Order moot.

In their

lower court memorandum, the Appellees quote §16 of the UAPA and
§§78-2a-3, 78-3-4(5), Utah Code Ann., for the proposition that a
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district court of Utah has no jurisdiction (or authority) to
order a Utah administrative agency to do what it is required to
do by law.

(R. 156-157.)

These statutes cited by the Appellees

are irrelevant to the issues in this appeal.

Such statutes

solely contemplate "final agency action" and judicial, not
agency, "appeals" from such "final agency action".

The

Appellants were never "appealing" anything to a Utah district
court or the Utah Court of Appeals.

For instance, the statute

cited below by the Appellees relative to a Utah district court's
appellate jurisdiction only relates to appeals of "informal
proceedings".

[Emphasis added.]

Appellants were not seeking

"appeal" of anything, merely "agency review" under §12 of the
UAPA, or, alternatively, certification of the ALJ's Rule 12(b)(1)
ruling for appeal. 4
It is noteworthy that had Appellants sought an
extraordinary writ in the Court of Appeals under Rule 19 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court of Appeals would have
directed Appellants to seek the same in district court.

Rule

19(b)(5) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an
explanation of why it would be "impractical or inappropriate" to
have filed a petition for any such writ in the district court.
Appellants would have had no explanation for such and therefore,
they acted lawfully in seeking such in the district court on

4
Th1s 1s not to Ignore that the Appellees have never contested Appellants' "Statement of
Material Facts" 1n their Supporting Memorandum before the district court. (R. 28-36, Exhibit
"J", App. hereto.)
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October 27, 1989.

In short, since Appellants are not seeking

"judicial appeal", but have merely sought to have the lower court
order the Securities Division to have done that which it was
required to do by law, having sought a writ from the Utah Court
of Appeals would have been erroneous, embarrassing, and a waste
of time and money.

The case of Aluminum Company of America

v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (D.C. Ct. of App. May 10,
1985) 761 F.2d 746, 245 U.S. App. D.C. 343, is directly on point.
In Aluminum Company, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the appropriate remedy for the ICCfs failure
to comply with its own statutory deadlines in a railroad rate
case is to seek and obtain, in district court, an order directing
the ICC to act. [Emphasis added.]

In further referring to the

federal counterpart to §12 of the UAPA, the D.C. Court of Appeals
said at p. 748:
It follows from the structure of these
provisions [the Administrative Procedure Act]
that the remedy for the Commission's failure
to comply with the statutory deadlines is the
remedy which the petitioners sought and
obtained in the District Court, an Order
directing the Commission to act -- not the
senseless remedy of cutting off the rights of
a totally innocent appellant. [Emphasis
added.]
No case could be more on point. Furthermore, the statutory
provision at issue in Aluminum Company, 5 USC §557(b)(1982), is
the federal statute expressly involving "agency review" as in
this case.

It is further undisputed that §12 of the Utah
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Administrative Procedures Act is patterned directly after the
very provision of the federal Administrative Procedure Act in
issue in Aluminum Company.

Based on Aluminum Company, not only

was it proper for Appellants to have sought an Extraordinary Writ
in the district court, but to have not reinstated such Writ and
Order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is reversible error.
POINT II
WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S ORDER
OF AUGUST 29, 1989, WAS "INTERLOCUTORY" OR "FINAL"
IS IRRELEVANT FOR PURPOSES OF §12 OF THE UAPA.
It makes no difference under the law whether the ALJ!s
order from which agency review is sought is "final". The lower
court, however, erroneously concluded the contrary.

To be sure,

Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann., by its own language, does not
require that orders be "final". For this reason, there can be no
dispute that under §12 of the UAPA it makes no difference what
kind of order is involved in a Request for Agency Review.

The

Appellees, in their Ex Parte Counter-Petition, misled the
district court by confusing §12 of the UAPA with §14 which does
contemplate "final orders". In other words, if there is some
obscure or secret Division policy whereby a request for agency
review only involves "final orders", such has never been so
publicized nor does the express language of §12 or the corollary
Department of Commerce Rules say the same. As a consequence,
Appellants have been severely prejudiced by the unilateral
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interpretation that Appellees have given to such statute and the
corollary agency rule which expressly applies to the Division.
The Appellees have exclusively relied on the case of
Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463, 118 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 68
(Utah Ct. App., October 2, 1989) for the proposition that under
§12 of the UAPA, an agency is not required to review anything but
"final orders". The argument thus follows that because the
Appellees secretly, capriciously and arbitrarily deemed the
August 29, 1989, Order of the ALJ not to be a "final order" (as
to anything), they did not have to review such under any
circumstances.

This is not what Sloan holds.

Sloan merely

involved an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals under §14 of the
UAPA.

In Sloan, the Court of Appeals only held that "an order of

an agency is not final [for purposes of appeal, not agency
review] so long as it reserves something to the agency for
further decision".

Sloan, supra at Adv. Rep. 68. On the other

hand, the ALJ's Order from which Appellants seek agency review
only involves whether or not the Division has jurisdiction to
have brought the on-going administrative adjudicative proceedings
in issue. There is nothing in such Order which reserves anything
to the ALJ or anyone else for further decision on the issue of
jurisdiction.

Yet what could be more "final" than the conferring

of jurisdiction?

For this reason, Appellants submit that the

Order from which review was sought was "final" under Sloan even
though finality is irrelevant under both §12 of the UAPA and the
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Division's own rule further interpreting the same.

Simply put,

the Appellees1 argument by which they secretly induced the
district court to err and hastily set aside its Oct. 27, Writ and
Order —

as if Appellants somehow acted improperly —

is itself

false and erroneous.
It is also grossly vague under the §12 of the UAPA
whether or not Appellee Baldwin, the ALJ and/or the Securities
Advisory Board is the "presiding officer".

The statute is

totally ambiguous in this regard, particularly when, in the ongoing administrative proceedings, two different people, including
the ALJ, in addition to Appellee Baldwin have executed pleadings
as the so-called "presiding officer".

Since this issue is

unclear, the Court's Writ and Order of October 27, which
specifically designated Appellee Baldwin and the Securities
Advisory Board as the "presiding officer", at least gives all
parties direction and otherwise prevents the Appellees from
further capriciously and arbitrarily doing what they in fact did
on October 30. For this reason, the Appellees abused their own
discretion and have prejudiced Appellants in hurriedly and
contemptuously appointing Director Baldwin, as late as Oct. 30,
as the "presiding officer", merely for the purpose of issuing the
October 30, 1989, Order on Agency Review to further render
Appellants' lower court Petition moot —

an Order only designed

to capriciously and arbitrarily deprive Appellants of any right
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or ability they and the Securities Advisory Board might have had
to get the Division's unlawful proceedings disposed of summarily.
Department of Commerce Rule R151-46b-12, D, ORDER ON
REVIEW —
—

a rule which necessarily governs the Division

requires that any written order on review shall issue within

20 days after the filing of any response.
App. hereto.)

(Exhibit "D",

In this case, the Division filed its response to

Appellants' September 26, 1989, Request well after 20 days had
long expired.

Because the Division clearly violated its own

agency rules, this Court should hold, if nothing else, that
Appellees granted Appellants' Requests by default.
and "C", App. hereto.)

(Exhibits "B"

For this reason alone, this Court should

confirm the Division's legal obligation to adhere and abide by
its own rules and make a determination of how and to what extent
Appellants have been prejudiced by the Division's intentional
failures in that regard.

If an agency can violate its own rules

any time it wants, what good are such rules other than to mislead
and deprive those similarly situated to Appellants with due
process of law.
The district court, in denying the motion to reinstate,
held that §12 of the UAPA only contemplates "final agency
action".

As a consequence, it further erroneously ruled that

there is no distinction between §12 and §14 of the UAPA.

If the

lower court is correct, then §12, UAPA, is a statutory
superfluity and has no reason to exist. To be sure, if an agency
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order is indeed "final", an aggrieved party would simply appeal
under §14. Thus, if the lower court is correct and §12 and §14
are to be interpreted identically, there would never be a
legitimate reason for a person to invoke or rely on §12. This is
not to ignore that §12, by its own unambiguous language only
contemplates an agency "order" and Department of Commerce Rule
R151-46b-12, §12's corollary, similarly only contemplates an
"order entered in a formal adjudicative proceeding".

For these

reasons, the lower courtfs conclusion that §12 and R1511-46b-l2
only contemplate "final" orders is plainly wrong.

In addition,

based on Sloan, which exclusively involves an interpretation of
§14 of the UAPA, the order sought review of in this case may
indeed be "final". This is because there is nothing further for
the Securities Division or the ALJ to have decided relative to
jurisdiction.

In fact, it is impossible to imagine how the

August 29, 1989, Order could be more "final" when its effect
allows the Division to continue to proceed against Appellants
unlawfully.

Nonetheless, if §12 of the UAPA and Rule 151-46b-12

of the Department of Commerce only contemplate "final orders",
then such statute and the corollary rule should so say. The
Appellees certainly have no authority to unilaterally interpret
such laws and rules for their own benefit for the "senseless
remedy of cutting off the rights of a totally innocent
appellant". Aluminum Company, supra at 748. Yet, this is
exactly what Appellees, their counsel, and the district court
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have done. Appellants spent a lot of time, energy, and
attorney's fees preparing their Requests for Agency Review only
to have Appellee Baldwin arbitrarily and capriciously deny their
Requests on October 30, and only after his personal receipt of
the district court!s Extraordinary Writ and Order directing him
and the Securities Advisory Board to do the opposite.

[Emphasis

added.] If this is also not contempt of the district court, then
the word "contempt" surely has no meaning, at least in this
jurisdiction.
POINT III
IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR APPELLEE
BALDWIN TO ACT AS INVESTIGATOR, PROSECUTOR,
JUDGE, JURY AND EXECUTIONER AT THE SAME
TIME IN THE SAME PROCEEDING, AND THEREFORE,
APPELLEE BALDWIN'S ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW
DATED OCTOBER 30, 1989, SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SET ASIDE AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
SHOULD NOW BE DISMISSED. IT IS ALSO HIGHLY
PREJUDICIAL FOR THE PROSECUTOR AND JUDGE(S)
TO BE REPRESENTED BY THE SAME COUNSEL AT THE SAME TIME.
It is undisputed that John C. Baldwin, Director of the
Division of Securities, has acted as "prosecutor" in having
signed Division pleadings in the on-going administrative
adjudicative proceedings.

For instance, Appellee Baldwin

personally executed the Division's Motion to Convert the
administrative proceedings in issue from informal to formal.
(Exhibit "I", App. hereto.)

It is also undisputed that

Director Baldwin has simultaneously acted as "judge" in drafting
and signing the Order on Agency Review.
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(R. 114-118; Exhibit

"H", App. hereto.) In addition, during the remainder of the
on-going administrative proceedings, Mr. Baldwin will continue to
act as judge ("presiding officer") of Appellants under the UAPA.
In this context, there is a plethora of authority in
administrative law that it is unconstitutional for a person to
serve as investigator, prosecutor, and judge in the same
administrative proceeding.

Withrow v. Larkin, supra. In

Withrow, Justice White, writing for a unanimous U.S. Supreme
Court, stated:
Cases in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary
interest in the outcome and in which he has
been the target of personal abuse or criticism
from the party before him are situations where
the probability of actual bias on the part of
the judge or decision-maker is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable under due process
of law.
Justice White went on to say:
To carry its burden of persuasion, the
contention that the combination of
investigative and adjudicative functions
necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk
of bias in administrative adjudication must
overcome a presumption of honesty and
integrity in those serving as adjudicators,
and it must convince that, under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness, conferring investigative and
adjudicative powers on the same individuals
poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is
to be adequately implemented. [Emphasis
added.]
Withrow at L.Ed. 723-24.

The on-going administrative

adjudicative proceedings have been heated; harsh criticisms have
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also been leveled by Appellants at the Division, including
Appellee Baldwin.

The Division has also sought (as a condition

of settlement) to unlawfully extract a $510,000 fine from
Appellants in order to extort them into capitulation and
therefore, Director Baldwin certainly has a pecuniary iaterest in
filling his agencyfs own administrative pockets at AppeLlants'
expense.

(R. 35; Exhibit "J", App. hereto.)

Based on Withrow

and Appellee Baldwinfs direct prosecutorial and adjudicative
participation in the on-going administrative proceedings, it is
an unconstitutional denial of due process to have permitted
Appellee Baldwin to arbitrarily and capriciously deny Appellants1
September 11, 1989 Requests for either \Agency Review and/or for
Certification.

(R. 114-118; Exhibit "H,f, App. hereto.) From a

more technical standpoint, it is unconstitutional that Appellee
Baldwin could have appointed himself as "presiding officer" under
§12 UAPA when he and his agency have an interest in the outcome
in their favor, when they would surely relish a $50,000 "capital
contribution" to their budget, when they themselves drafted the
instant administrative petitions, when they issued the order
denying agency review, when they will continue to prosecute and
judge Appellants, and when they have further been direct targets
of harsh criticism from Appellants. Therefore, as a matter of
law, the probability of actual bias on the part of Appellee
Baldwin as prosecutor and judge of his own petitions against
Appellants is clear and such is unconstitutional.
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For these

reasons, Baldwin's arbitrary and capricious Order, hastily,
haphazardly, and conveniently denying Appellants1 Requests on
October 30, should be set aside in its entirety and the
administrative adjudicative proceedings should now be dismissed
as unconstitutional and unfair.

(That the foregoing

Constitutional issues were indeed before the lower court is
evidenced by pages 186-188 of the Record.)
Furthermore, the Attorney General is in the malignantly
preposterous position of representing the Division, Director
Baldwin, the "presiding officer", and the entire Securities
Advisory Board at the same time.

It is thus evident that there

is no distinction in this case between the prosecutors, the
investigators, the judges, jury, and the executioners.

For this

reason alone, the on-going administrative adjudicative
proceedings are unconstitutional and unfair on their face in that
all such parties clearly have a unity of interest —
quite adverse to that of Appellants.

an interest

Because the adjudication of

Appellants1 interests in these proceedings can be neither
impartial nor protected, this Court should rule that Appellees
have a blatant conflict of interest and, as a consequence, none
of them can lawfully sit in judgment of Appellants.

It should

thus dismiss the Division's amended petitions with prejudice.
POINT IV
THE DIVISION LACKS JURISDICTION TO HAVE
BROUGHT THE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST APPELLANTS AND THEREFORE,
THIS COURT SHOULD ISSUE A DECISION DISMISSING
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SUCH PROCEEDINGS IN THEIR ENTIRETY.
The Division lacks jurisdiction to discipline Appellants
in a manner regulatorily inconsistent with superseding federal
law.

Under the law, Appellants, as members of the NASD, have

unambiguous federal obligations to honor outstanding Exchange Act
contracts in securities they have traded with other NASD members.
By way of background, the Division suspended exemptions in Utah
for the offer and sale of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock on
March 1, 1989.

(Exhibit "T", App. hereto.)

In an effort to

honor previous contracts for the sale of U.S.A. Medical stock
entered into by Appellant Johnson-Bowles prior to March 1, 1989,
Johnson-Bowles purchased sufficient U.S.A. Medical stock to
consummate such federal, Exchange Act contracts.

[Emphasis

added.] At the same time, Appellants undertook such to comply
with U.S. District Judge J. Thomas Greene!s February 28, 1989,
denial of their motion for preliminary injunction, a federal
ruling which necessarily required Appellants to honor such
outstanding Exchange Act contracts.
Exhibit "J", App. hereto.)

(R. 3 3; I's 15 and 16,

In this regard, it is undisputed that

the Division's Summary Order of March 1, 1989, does not prohibit
the "purchase" of U.S-A* Medical stock for any purpose.
60-64; Exhibit "T", App. hereto).

(R.

Furthermore, the SEC has

clearly carved out an exception in this very situation which
specifically allows the consummation of securities transactions
by broker-dealers during a suspension of trading order.
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(R. -65;

Exhibit "Q", App. hereto.) However., as a result of how the
Division ignorantly misinterprets its own power and authority
vis-a-vis federal securities regulation, the Division brought the
instant administrative adjudicative proceedings against
Appellants.

For instance, in such July 1989 amended petitions,

the Division basically alleges that Appellants should have
ignored their federal obligations, including U.S. District Judge
Greene's ruling, and that Appellants1 good faith purchases of
U.S.A. Medical stock simply to deliver the same to fellow
out-of-state NASD member broker-dealers and clearing corporations
(not Utah residents) was a "dishonest or unethical practice" as
contemplated in Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1)(g).

(See Exhibit "S",

App. hereto, a true and correct copy of the Division's Amended
Petitions in issue.)
Accordingly, the Division seeks to discipline Appellants
merely for complying with federal law, all as if the Utah Uniform
Securities Act somehow magically preempts federal securities law,
more especially the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Because of
this diametrically conflicting regulation on the part of the
Division, which no respectable business person on earth should
have to tolerate, Appellants so moved the ALJ under Rule 12(b)(1)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an order dismissing the
Division's amended petitions on the grounds of jurisdiction and
federal preemption.

It is the ALJ's August 29, 1989, erroneous

denial of such motion which gave rise to the Requests for Agency
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Review directly in issue. Without belaboring this Brief more
particularly in this regard, reference is made to pages 26-89 in
the lower court record, true and correct copies of Appellants1
Supporting and Reply Memorandums in support of their Requests for
Agency Review.

In the interests of judicial economy, this Court

has an obligation to address the propriety of the Division's
underlying jurisdiction, including the preemption issue, only
because it is the underlying basis of this appeal.

See R. 26-76;

Exhibit "J", Appendix hereto, a true and correct copy of
Appellants1 Brief in Support of their Request for Agency Review.
CONCLUSION
When a statute establishes a specific scheme for
obtaining review, courts are to assume that such set of
procedures is exclusive.

Central Lincoln Peoples1 Utility

District v. Johnson, (9th Cir. 1984) 735 F.2d 1101, 1109; Nader
v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 261, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

Since the Division

has violated its own internal agency rule, this Court must
properly interpret §12 and the corollary agency rule. This Court
should further decide the Constitutional issues wholly ignored by
the district court —

issues ignored only because the district

court erroneously held that it lacks jurisdiction to have
entertained any of that which was before it.

In the meantime,

because the administrative adjudicative proceeding procedures in
issue have already proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits,
there is no reason why this Court should delay and not further
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decide the merits of Appellants1 Requests for Agency Review. The
merits of the ALJfs August 29, 1989, Order is thus ripe for
review by this Court.

Such will also dispense with a second

appeal of the entire administrative adjudicative proceedings
which will no doubt be forthcoming in the event this Court fails
to address the underlying merits of this appeal•
Appellants filed their Requests for Agency Review only
because they believed that the Division lacked jurisdiction to
discipline Appellants in a manner diametrically inconsistent with
the mandates of the Securities Exchange Act of 19 34 —

a federal

Act which directly regulates Appellants in their capacities as a
securities broker-dealer and agent. The Division did nothing
within 20 days as required by the rule and yet on the day it
received the Writ and Order of the district court directing it to
grant and review Appellants' Requests, Director Baldwin
hurriedly, arbitrarily and capriciously denied such Requests in
contempt of the district court. As this Court can see from
Appellants' Requests [R. 8-12, 19-20, 26-89; Exhibits "B" and
ff

C", App. hereto ], there are substantial grounds upon which the

on-going administrative proceedings should have been dismissed in
their entirety.

This is so regardless of the constitutional

deprivations subsequently imposed by Mr. Baldwin and the Attorney
General through their blatantly conflicting and prejudicial
roles.
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Based on the foregoing, this court should grant
Appellants the following relief:

(1) it should hold that the

district court has jurisdiction to have entertained Appellants1
Petition for Extraordinary Writ directing Appellees, together as
"presiding officer", to either grant Appellants1 Requests or
certify the ALJfs order as "final"; (2) it should hold that
Appellees committed contempt of the district court by ignoring
the Extraordinary Writ and Order on October 30, 1989; (3) it
should hold that the district court erred in not granting
Appellants1 Motion to Reinstate; (4) it should determine to what
extent Appellants have been prejudiced (or are now damaged) by
the Appellees' conduct, what relief is now available to
Appellants, if any, and whether it was fair and constitutional to
have allowed the Securities Advisory Board Appellees to sit in
judgment of Appellants on July 16, 1990; (5) it should further
decide the Constitutional issues involving Baldwin (and the
entire Securities Advisory Board) that the district court wholly
ignored and thus determine whether the administrative proceedings
should now be dismissed as unconstitutional; (6) it should make a
determination as to the effect of the Attorney General's blatant
conflict of interest; (7) it should decide that Director Baldwin
be prohibited from acting in the future as appellate judge
relative to any forthcoming "final agency action"; (8) it should
decide who is unbiased and impartial enough to rule on any
forthcoming "final agency action"; and (9) it should fully
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address the overall merits of Appellants1 Requests and determine
whether the Division does indeed have jurisdiction to discipline
Appellants for reasons diametrically at odds with the mandates of
the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. At a minimum, Appellants are
entitled to a determination as to whether the Securities Division
either lacks jurisdiction or is preempted from having brought the
administrative adjudicative proceedings [Exhibit "S", App.
hereto] and whether such proceedings were and have been pursued
unlawfully.

(See Western Capital, supra, holding that state

courts have no jurisdiction to interpret NASD Rules.)
Accordingly, this Court should decide whether the administrative
adjudicative proceedings should have been (or should now be)
dismissed in their entirety with prejudice.
The Appellees' position in this case is unfounded and
unsupported by the irrelevant authority cited by them in the
court below.

Even 5 U.S.C. §557(b)(1982), the portion of the

federal Administrative Procedure Act on which §12 of the UAPA is
based, does not exclusively contemplate "final orders". This is
also not to lose sight of the fact that the ALJfs Order of August
29, 1989, could not be more "final" from a procedural standpoint,
a standpoint which §12, UAPA, was designed to address. Moreover,
it is unconstitutional for Baldwin to wear an investigator,
prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner's hat which he has done,
is doing, and will continue to do throughout not only the
on-going administrative proceedings, but in future administrative
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adjudicative proceedings.

Simply put, Director Baldwin has no

business wearing every conceivable regulatory hat imaginable at
the same time.

In f a c t , how many hats i s one person e n t i t l e d to

wear and what hat could Baldwin wear t h a t he has not worn, i s not
already wearing, or w i l l not wear in the future? 5

Furthermore,

how many persons p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the i n s t a n t administrative
adjudicative proceedings i s the Attorney General e n t i t l e d to
represent, to what extent, in what c a p a c i t i e s , and for what
purposes?
Based on the foregoing, the d i s t r i c t court erred in
concluding t h a t i t lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n over Appellants 1 P e t i t i o n
for Extraordinary Writ.

In the i n t e r e s t s of j u d i c i a l economy and

f a i r n e s s , t h i s Court should address a l l of these issues and even
go further and determine whether the D i v i s i o n ' s amended p e t i t i o n s
are and were c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and/or consistent with p r i n c i p l e s of
federal preemption.

Such a determination would be d i s p o s i t i v e of

the e n t i r e administrative adjudicative proceedings in t h a t i f the
Division lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n , the amended p e t i t i o n s f i l e d against
Appellants should never have e i t h e r been i n i t i a t e d or allowed to
proceed to a formal hearing — a l l at great and u n j u s t i f i e d
expense t o the taxpayers and Appellants — a f t e r nearly VA years

5

The Court should note that because the administrative adjudicative proceedings went to a full
hearing on July 16, 1990, before the Securities Advisory Board, Appellee Baldwin, as director and
"presiding officer", will get but another chance to judge Appellants. This 1s because Appellants
understand that under the UAPA, Mr. Baldwin must "sign off" or approve the Securities Advisory
Board's decision with respect to Appellants' licenses. Appellants believe and assert that this
1s again unfair and only bolsters their argument that Mr. Baldwin's role 1n both prosecuting and
judging them at the same time 1s severely prejudicial and unconstitutional.
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of bitter and protracted litigation.

This Court should thus

reverse the district court, address issues it ignored, and
dismiss the Division's amended petitions on either constitutional
or jurisdictional (preemption) grounds.
Finally, the Division violated its own internal rules
governing agency review and therefore, the Requests in issue,
even if arguably discretionary on the part of the Division, were
granted by default.

Certainly, agency rules are of no value if

an agency can violate them willy-nilly and with impunity.
Because the law on §12 of the UAPA is unclear, Appellants are
entitled to an appropriate ruling of this Court to prevent future
misinterpretation and discrimination under §12, UAPA.

Certainly

the Division had nothing to lose by having granted Appellants'
Requests and all parties clearly had something to gain if indeed
the Division lacks jurisdiction to have brought the
administrative adjudicative proceedings in issue.
DATED t h i s ^

day of August, ^990,

Michael Coombs
:raig F. McCullough
(Attorneys for Appellants
PROOF OF SERVICE

.

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the *C—day of
August, 1990, (s)he hand-delivered four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to Mark J. Griffin,
Attorney for Appellees, 115 State C^pi^ol Building, Salt, Lak/
City, Utah 84114.
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EXHIBIT "A

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Registration of
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.
CRD No. 07678

:
:
:

In the Matter of the Registration of
Marten Vernon Johnson
CRD No. 2598888

:
:
:

MOTION TO DISMISS AND
ACCOMPANYING ORDER
Case No. SD-89-46BD
Case No. SD-89-47AG

Appearances:
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents
Mark J. Griffin for the Division of Securities
By the Administrative Law Judge:
By Motion, dated July 3,1989, Respondents seek a dismissal of the instant adjudicative
proceedings. A memorandum in opposition thereto wasfiledby the Division on July 13,1989. On the
just-stated date. Respondents alsofiledan affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss.
Oral argument on the pending motion was conducted on July 14,1989, at which time Respondents
filed a reply memorandum and copies of six (6) letters relative thereto.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. is a securities broker and Respondent Marten
Vernon Johnson is a securities agent and principil of the just-named company. Respondents are duly
registered by the Division of Securities of the Stmt of Utah.

00013
EXHIBIT _ l f i l — —

2. By Summary Order, dated March 1,1989, the Division denied the availability of all
transactional exemptionsrelativeto the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation. The Summary Order has
been in effect on a continuous basis since the just-stated date.
3. Prior to entry of the March 1,1989 Summary Order, Respondent Johnson, as an agent and
principal for Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., had effected transactions in the securities of
U.S A. Medical Corporation. Sparing detail, outstanding contracts existed between Respondent JohnsonBowles Company, Inc. and various third panics respecting the sale of the securities in question by
Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. to those third parties. Specifically, said contracts existed prior
to issuance of the March 1,1989 Summary Order.
4. Given the just-described contracts, and in order to effect the delivery of the securities in question
to various third parties, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., through Respondent Marlen Vernon
Johnson, purchased approximately 364,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock from seven (7)
individuals between April 3,1989 and April 13,1989. Respondents were aware of the March 1,1989
Summary Order when the just-described purchases were made.
5. On April 27,1989, the Division filed a Notice of Agency Action and Petition, wherein it was
alleged that Respondents had willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with the March 1,1989
Summary Order and that they had engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business.
Pursuant to an Amended Petition, dated July 19,1989, the Division has withdrawn the allegation that
Respondents had either willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with the March 1,1989 Summary
Order. However, based on the allegation that Respondents have engaged in dishonest or unethical practices
in the securities business, the Division seeks entry of an order suspending or revoking the respective
registration of Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and Marlen Vernon Johnson.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents assert that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction to initiate the instant
proceeding and to enter any disciplinary sanction as to their existing registration. Specifically, Respondents
contend that rules of conduct promulgated by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)

2

required that they complete their existing contracts by cither payment or delivery of the securities in
question. Respondents further contend that compliance with that directive prompted their purchase of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securitiesfromcertain Utah residents subsequent to the issuance of the March
1,1989 Summary Order and that said Order prohibited only the sale, but not the purchase, of the just-stated
securities. In essence. Respondents urge that the pertinent NASD rules of conduct promulgated pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 necessarily supercede the operation of the March 1,1989 Summary
Order and, thus, the instant proceeding should be dismissed.
During oral argument on the pending motion, counsel for Respondents extensively addressed those
rules of conduct which govern NASD members and whether Respondents could have been subject to
disciplinary sanction regarding their membership in that organization for any failure to comply with said
rules. In rejoinder, counsel for the Division has urged that Respondents could have fulfilled their
contractual obligations to third parties by means other than a purchase of U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities, but that it was financially advantageous for Respondents to act as they did. The Division has
also asserted that Respondents solicited the sale of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities and that any such
solicitation is relevant to whether Respondents engaged in dishonest and unethical securities practices.
Notwithstanding the belabored arguments which were presented as to the foregoing matters, the
operative effect of the March 1,1989 Summary Order was to prevent the sale of unregistered securities to
Utah residents. Both parties concede that those securities had been the subject of market manipulation and
sccuriues fraud. Under such circumstances, issuance of the Summary Order was clearly intended to preclude
any subsequent sale of diosc securities within this state.
With knowledge of the existence of the Summary Order, Respondents purchased said securities
from certain Utah residents. In so doing, Respondents* conduct effectively frustrated the attempts of the
Division to preclude the trading of those unregistered securities. Whether Respondents solicited the sale of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities (and Respondents have strenuously urged that they did not), it is
obvious that their participation in those transactions as a purchaser of those securities facilitated a violation
of the Summary Order as to potentially subject them to disciplinary sanction in these proceedings.
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Respondents' assertion that NASD rules of conduct should be accorded the force and effect of federal
law, as to thus obviate compliance with the March 1,1989 Summary Order, is not well-founded.
Concededly, had Respondents owned the securities prior to March 1,1989 and merely delivered those
securities to third parties after the Summary Order had been issued, such a ministerial act may not have
exposed Respondents to possible revocation or suspension of their registration. However, Respondents'
purchase of the securities after March 1,1989 to effect their subsequent delivery of those securities to third
parties was squarely at odds with the operative effect of the March 1,1989 Summary Order. Simply put,
any necessary compliance by Respondents with NASD rules as a member of that self-regulatory
organization does not lend support to the conclusion that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction in
this case.
Two further matters should be addressed. Both parties have noted certain aggravating and/or
mitigating factors in this case and have urged that such factors should be considered relative to the merits of
the pending motion. Without doubt, such circumstances are relevant as to any possible entry of a
disciplinary sanction at some subsequent stage in these proceedings. However, those factors are not
germane to the matter presently before the Court
Respondents have also requested that any order denying the pending motion be certified as "final",
so that necessary review of that order can be sought Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as
amended, provides that parties to any adjudicative proceeding may seek review "of an order by the agency"
and sets forth the procedure to obtain any such review. R151-46b-12(A) is further applicable in that
respect Presumably, Respondents'requestthat any order issued on the pending motion be certified as final
is one directed toward the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, which provides:
(1) Any party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. (fill
emphasis herein added).
It is not wiihin the province of this Court to decided whether the order set forth below is "final", as to allow
for subsequent judicial review, nor to certify any such order as being final for purposes of such review.
However, the order herein is subject to agency review, as set forth above.
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ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion to dismiss the July 19,1989
Amended Petition is denied.
Dated this

<2jL?Z_d2y

of August, 1989.

j£/Cjteven Eklund
unistrative Law Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that 1 have this day mailed the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Accompanying
Order, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to John Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111; to Craig F. McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Floor, Kennecott
Building, 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents; and to
Mark J. Griffin. Assistant Attorney General for tfie Division of Securities at Tax & Business Regulation
Division. 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
Dated this

CN?^

day of August, 1989.

QOOl?
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

Case No. SD-89-46BD

CRD NO. 07678

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:

:

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON

:

Case No. SD-89-47AG

CRD NO. 2598888

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in accordance with §63-46b-12. Utah Code Ann.,
and/or R151-46b-12(A) of the Rules of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings Before the
Department of Business Regulation. Respondents hereby request agency or superior agency
review of the Administrative Law Judge's Order dated August 29, 1989. a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Respondents' Exhibit
"A". Respondents further request oral argument in accordance therewith. This Request is
timely filed in that Respondents' counsel did not receive the August 29. Order until August
31. 1989.
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Respondents' grounds for requesting agency or superior agency review and
oral argument thereon include but are not limited to the following:
(1) the Court's August 29.1989. Order. Exhibit "A" hereto, is non-responsive to
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and erroneously treats Respondents'
motion as a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as argued at the hearing by the Division;
(2) the Order contains erroneous, superfluous, and irrelevant findings of fact
and conclusions of law relative to Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion and otherwise assumes
facts neither pleaded, admitted, nor in evidence and which otherwise improperly tend to go
to the merits of the Division's case;
(3) the Order erroneously compels the necessary legal conclusion that it would
have been possible for Respondents, as Utah residents, to have complied with their federal
NASD and SEC obligations, either themselves or by allowing -buy-ins- for their -own
account-, without violating the Division's unilateral and capricious interpretation of its own
March 1. Order;
(4) the Order is erroneous as a matter of law in concluding that the Division
has been delegated power and authority (i.e.. jurisdiction) to issue orders, unilaterally
interpret them, and thereby discipline an NASD member merely for obeying and complying
with superseding and pre-emptive federal securities law — -state action- further repugnant
to the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution in that Congress has
expressly delegated enforcement and interpretation of an NASD and SEC duty, liability, or
obligation to the federal courts under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
(5) the Order could not be more erroneous as a matter of law in concluding on
page 4 that NNASD rules . . . should not be accorded the force and effect of federal l a w . . .

-2-
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(6) the Order is erroneous in concluding that the Division's March 1. 1989
Order — which says nothing of prohibiting -purchases" — quite literally supersedes and
overrides federal securities law specifically governed under the Exchange Act and over
which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction;
(7) the Order is erroneous as a matter of law insofar as it concludes that the
Division, in light of 128(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. can inconsistently regulate and
even discipline federal licensees contrary to express mandates of federal law. specifically.
that the Division can deem an act "unethical" when the preemptive federal regulatory
scheme declares the very same act "ethical";
(8) the Order is erroneous in concluding that the Division can give unlawful
extra-territorial effect to its Order of March 1 and otherwise give such Order a predatory
and discriminatory effect on Respondents; and
(9) the August 29. 1989 Order is erroneous in not concluding that the
Division's Amended Petitions are barred by pre-emption under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and otherwise repugnant to the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution.
Respondents have the right to seek agency review of the August 29. Order and
otherwise exhaust their administrative remedies in that if the Division lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, which it does, these entire proceedings are unlawful and a waste of all parties'
time, energy, and money, particularly when such proceedings have already subjected and
continue to subject Respondents to substantial damages. Respondents further have a right
to seek agency review of the Order of August 29. because it is not a "non-final procedural
ruling" of the Division. Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. Atomic Energy Commission,

-3-
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433 F.2d 524, 526 (D.C.Cir. 1970). See also Ecee, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission, 526
F.2d 1270, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert, dented, 429 U.S. 866. 97 S.Ct. 176. 50 L.Ed.2d 147 (1976);
Coca-Cola Company v. Federal Trade Commission. 475 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir.). cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 877. 94 S.Ct. 121. 38 LEd.2d 122 (1973).
Based on the foregoing and §63-46b-12(1)(b)(ii), Utah Code Ann., Respondents
pray for immediate reversal of the August 29,1989 Order and for an Order declaring that
the Division has no jurisdiction to either unilaterally interpret its March 1. 1989 Order
inconsistently with federal securities law or otherwise bring a revocation proceeding
against an NASD member merely for obeying, complying, or attempting to comply with
superseding Exchange Act rules and regulations.
In accordance with applicable Department of Commerce rules. Respondents
herewith file a Brief in support of their grounds for review. The parties seeking review
further sign this Request as required under §63-46(b)-12(b)(i). Utah Code Ann.
Respondents further hereby give notice that the Division shall have fifteen (15) days from
the date of its receipt hereof to file a responsive pleading if it so desires.
DATED this / / ctyof September, 1/

Coombs
^Attorney for Respondents
JOHNSON-BOWLES. COMPANY, INC.,
Respondent

Its: President

-4-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of September. 1989,
(s)he hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR AGENCY
REVIEW AND REQUEST FOR HEARING to John C. Baldwin. Director and Kathleen C. McGinley.
Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities Division. Utah Department of Commerce. 160
East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802: Administrative Law Judge
and presiding officer J. Stephen Eklund. Esq., Department of Commerce, 160 East 300
South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; and mailed the same to Mark J.
Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General. 115 State Capitol. Salt Lake City. Utah 84114; and
Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. of Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th
Floor. Kennecott Bldg., 10 East South Temple Street. Salt Lake City, Utah 84133.

J:REQUEST.2-3

(
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION
OF AUGUST 29. ORDER AS A
"FINAL AGENCY ACTION"

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

Case No. SD-89-46BD

CRD NO. 07678

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AG

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

In the event the Court, the Securities Advisory Board, the Executive Director.
Presiding Officer, or other appellate body, denies Respondents a request for agency or
superior agency review under 863-46b-12. Utah Code Ann., and/or the applicable agency
rules promulgated thereunder. Respondents herewith request certification of the
Administrative Law Judge's Order of August 29.1989 as a "final agency action" as
contemplatecl in §63-46b-14<1). Utah Code Ann. In the alternative. If the agency or superior
agency denies Respondents' request for certification of such Order as a "final agency

00019
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action*1. Respondents pray for an order declaring that Respondents' have exhausted all of
the administrative remedies available to them with respect to whether the Division has
subject-matter jurisdiction as contemplated In S63-46b-14(2)(a). Utah Code Ann.
In the alternative. Respondents pray that the agency or superior agency's order
with respect to this request be itself certified as a "final agency action** as contemplated in
§63-46b-14(1). Utah Code Ann.
DATED this 11th day of September. }

Jfchn Michael Coombs
attorney for Respondents
CERTIFICATE 0F SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of September. 1989.
(s)he hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR
CERTIFICATION OF ORDER AS A "FINAL AGENCY ACTION** to John C. Baldwin. Director and
Kathleen C. McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities Division. Utah
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge and presiding officer J. Stephen Eklund. Esq..
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.d. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah
84145-0802; and mailed the same to Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General. 115
State Capitol. Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. Callister. Duncan.
& Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor. Kennecott Bldg.. 10 East South Temple
Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 8413°

J:REQUEST.1

-2-
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EXHIBIT "D"

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF
BUSINESS REGULATION

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION

EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1,1988
PROMULGATED PURSUANT TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
(SECTION 63-46b-l ct. seq.)
AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT
(SECTION 63-46a-l ct. seq.)

1/

EXHIBIT.

"A
COiSo

R151-46b-12 Agency Review.
A. FILING OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW.
A request for agency review may be filed within ten days after the
issuance of findings of fact, conclusions of law and the order entered in a
formal adjudicative proceeding or the issuance of the order in an informal
adjudicative proceeding. Said petition shall be filed with the agency head
of the division in which the matter originated. Any brief in support of the
grounds for review shall be concurrently filed with the request for agency
review. Any response to the request for agency review, including any brief
in support thereof, shall also be filed with the agency head within fifteen
days of the mailing of the request for review.
B. EFFECT OF FILING.
Upon the timely filing of a request for agency review, the effective date
of the previously issued order shall be suspended until ten days after the
order on review has been mailed to all parties.
C. ORAL ARGUMENT.
A request for agency review and the response thereto shall set forth
whether oral argument is sought as to said review. Upon request of any
party, the agency head may set a time to conduct oral argument.
D. ORDER ON REVIEW.
A written order on review shall issue within 20 days after the filing of
any response or, if applicable, the submission of the matter after oral
argument. The order on review shall provide notice to any aggrieved parties
of any right to further administrative reconsideration or judicial review.

EXHIBIT " E "

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Petitioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL fclSTfiiCT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.. a
Utah corporation and MARLEN V.
JOHNSON,

EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

Petitioners,

JOHN C. BALDWIN. Director,
Securities Division of the
Department of Commerce, State
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER,
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY.
MARGARET WICKENS. and KEITH
CANNON, members of the Securities
Advisory Board overseeing the
Securities Division,

CASE NO.

S^Ofc^OI* ( V

JUDGE MMES s.

Respondents

mm

The Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the above-matter seeking issuance of a
writ from this Court to be directed to Respondents to either grant Petitioners' Request for
Agency Review (and thereby review the same) or to otherwise certify the subject order on
review as a "final agency action" having come before this Court; the Court having reviewed
the Petition and having determined that a hearing is not necessary, and good cause further
appearing, the Court hereby orders as follows:
1. The Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the above-matter is hereby granted.
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2. The Respondents are hereby immediately directed to undertake one of the
following courses of action:
(1)

Either grant Petitioners' Request for Agency Review as contemplated in
the Exhibits attached to the Petition and thereupon resolve all issues
presented therein. 0£

(2)

Certify the Administrative Law Judge's Order of August 29. 1989. as a
"final agency action" as contemplated in §63-46b-14. Utah Code Ann.

DATED this^/day of October. 1989.

BY THSydoURT

TniW District Court Judge
ORDER.1

-2-
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EXHIBIT "F
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Petitioners

'.'„ i
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.. a
Utah corporation and MARLEN V.
JOHNSON.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Petitioners.
v.
JOHN C. BALDWIN. Director.
Securities Division of the
Department of Commerce. State
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER.
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY.
MARGARET WICKENS. and KEITH
CANNON, members of the Securities
Advisory Board overseeing the
Securities Division,

CASE NO. 890906506CV

Respondents

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 27th day of October, 1989, (s)he
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR EX PARTE EXTRAORDINARY
WRIT and EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND EXTRAORDINARY WRIT
by certified mail, postage prepaid to JOHN C. BALDWIN. Director of Securities Division,
located at 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; and to M.
TRUMAN BOWLER, Securities Advisory Board Member, located at 124 South 200 East. St.
George, Utah 84770. The undersigned also certifies that the same documents were

- 1 -
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hand-delivered to Securities Advisory Board Members. KENT BURGON. located at 60 East
South Temple. Salt Lake City. Utah 84111; DAVID E. HARDY, located at 215 South State
Street. Suite 900. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2309; MARGARET WICKENS. located at 376
East 400 South. Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and KEITH CANNON, located at 115
South Main Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 84111.

SRVC.l

/ I
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EXHIBIT "G

FfiES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

v m

r

R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312
Utah Attorney General
MARK J. GRIFFIN, #4329
Assistant Attorney General
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
(801) 538-1331

0 1 w*9
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC., a
Utah Corporation and MARLEN V.
JOHNSON,

UTAH

EX PARTE ORDER SETTING
ASIDE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

Petitioners,
vs.
JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director,
Securities Division of the
Department of Commerce, State
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER,
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY,
MARGARET WICKENS, AND KEITH
CANNON, members of the
Securities Advisory Board
overseeing the Securities
Division,

Case No. 890906506 CV

Judge James S. Sawaya

Respondents.
The Court having reviewed the Ex Parte Petition to Set Aside
Ex Parte Order issued by this Court on October 27, 1989, and the
Court being satisfied in having heard the Respondent's arguments
in support of the Petition and being satisfied that there is just
cause appearing therefore, hereby

ooion

ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that this Court's Ex Parte
Order dated October 27, 1989, requiring the Respondents to
perform certain acts, is hereby set aside.
DATED this

/ -

day of

~~)^^70^p(Jx/t>,

1989.
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW
REGISTRATION OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC.
CRD No. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46B

IN THE MATTER OF THE
REGISTRATION OF:
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 259888

Case No. SD-89-47AG

On September 11, 1989, Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company,
Inc. and Marlen Vernon Johnson, pursuant to §63-46b-12 Utah Code
Ann. and R151-46-b-12A of the Rules of Procedure for Adjudicative
Proceedings before the Department of Business Regulation, requested
agency review of an August 29, 1989 Order, and asked for an oral
hearing thereon.
Motion

to

Dismiss

The August 29, 1989 Order denied Respondents
the

Amended

Petition

of the

Division of

Securities (the Division).
Respondents have also requested certification of the August
29, 1989 Order as a "final agency action," or, in the alternative,
asked for an order declaring that Respondents had exhausted their
administrative remedies regarding the issue of subject matter

0 0,* i< * ^

jurisdiction.
Respondents also requested that any order issued on review
also be certified as a "final agency" action.
Finally, Respondents requested that the Division disclose
whether the Securities Advisory Board constitutes the Appellate
Body performing this review, in order to determine the existence
of any conflicts of interest by David Eccles Hardy, a member of
that Board.
On September 11, 1989, Respondents filed a brief in support
of their request for agency review and oral hearing thereon.

On

September 26, 1989, the Securities Division filed a brief in reply
to Respondents1 request for agency review and hearing. On October
6, 1989 Respondents filed a reply brief in support of their request
for agency review.

THE DIRECTOR, AS PRESIDING OFFICER, now enters the following:

Section 63-46b-12 Utah Code Ann. sets forth the procedure
which governs administrative review of agency orders. That statute
vests agencies with the discretion to provide, by rule, whether
parties to any adjudicative proceeding may seek "review of an order
by the agency or by a superior agency".

R151-46b-12A of the Rules

of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of
Business Regulation allows such requests to be made as follows:
A request for agency review may be filed...after the issuance
of findings of fact, conclusions of law and the order entered
in a formal adjudicative proceeding... .

CO

Section 63-46b-13 provides that if agency review of "an order" is
not available pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 "and if the order would
otherwise constitute final agency action", a party may request
agency reconsideration of "the order".

Section 63-46b-14 also

provides that an aggrieved party "may obtain judicial review of
final agency action...".
Section 63-46b-12 and R151-46b-12 do not expressly limit
agency review to orders which constitute final agency action.
Thus, a party aggrieved by orders of an interim nature (i.e., an
order denying a request for a continuance or an order denying a
motion to dismiss) could arguably request agency review of such
matters.

However, in Sloan v. Board of Review, 118 Utah Adv. Rep

68 (October 2, 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals distinguishes
orders, which are not reviewable because they are not "final", from
orders which do constitute "final agency action", by stating that
"an order of the agency is not final so long as it reserves
something to the agency for further decision".

Id. at 68. In the

Sloan case, the Court dismissed an appeal due to the lack of a
final agency order.
Given the nature of the August 29, 1989 Order, Respondents1
request represents an interlocutory appeal and, following Sloan,
would

not

be considered

a final

agency

action.

Review of

interlocutory matters would necessarily deprive agency adjudicative
proceedings of the simplicity

and

speed

contemplated

by the

Administrative Procedures Act and the rules governing adjudicative
proceedings in this Department, and would inappropriately interpose
an interlocutory appeal process within the Department.

COi'6

In essence, absent a rule permitting agency review pursuant
to Section 63-46b-12, agency reconsideration pursuant to Section
63-46b-13 is only available as to an order which constitutes final
agency action. The availability of judicial review is also limited
to such orders.

In light of the provisions which govern agency

reconsideration and judicial review, and mindful of the rationale
expressed in Sloan v. Board of Review, it is ill-advised to conduct
agency review of orders which do not constitute final agency
action. Although Section 63-46b-12 and R151-46b-12 do not so limit
the availability of agency review, the efficient administration of
agency adjudicative proceedings compels the conclusion that such
interpretation be given.

ORDER
WHEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Respondents' Request for Agency Review and oral argument

thereon are denied.
2. Respondents' Requests that both the August 29, 1989 order
and this Order on Review, be certified as "final agency action",
are denied because it is not considered to be within the province
of the Presiding Officer to so certify or declare.
3.
Securities

Respondents'
Advisory

consideration

concerns regarding

Board

of these

member

requests

David
are

the

Eccles

involvement of
Hardy

inapplicable,

in the

since the

Director has acted as the Presiding Officer, and accordingly,
Respondents' request for an order to disclose any conflicts of
interest is also denied.

ooi

Dated this

3#

day of October, 1989

rohn C. Baldwin
Director, Division of Securities
Presiding Officer
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing
Order on Agency Review properly addressed, postage prepaid, to John
Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; to Craig F. McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th
Floor, Kennecott Building, 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents; and to Mark J.
Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for the Division of Securities
at Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114.
Dated this v5$

day of October, 1989.

Te/ri Farn^orth
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DIVISION OF SECURITIES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
JOHN C. BALDWIN, DIRECTOR
P.O. BOX 45802
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 530-6600

BEFORE THE UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Registration
of Johnson-Bowles, Inc. to Act as
Securities Broker-Dealer

MOTION TO
CONVERT TO FORMAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDING

CRD NO. 07578

Case No. SD-89-46BD

The Division of Securities of the Department of Commerce of
the State of Utah, by and through its Director, John C. Baldwin,
hereby moves to convert administrative adjudicative proceedings
from informal to formal in the above entitled matter. The basis
for this Motion is that it will serve the public interest because
it will prevent the duplication of this hearing process should the
outcome be challenged in the future and neither party is prejudiced
because no hearing date has been set and only the formality of the
hearing not the presentation
of the evidence is effected.
present
DATED this

ML

day of

£
C. BALDWIN, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF SECURITIES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

1989.

EXHIBIT "J
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OBTHE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

:
:
:
:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN
SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR
AGENCY REVIEW AND HEARING
THEREON

CRD NO. 07678

:

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AG

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

Respondents Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson, by and
through their counsel, hereby submit this Brief in Support of their Requests for Agency
Review and a Hearing Thereon as provided in Department of Commerce Rule
R151-46b-12(A). Respondents incorporate by reference their pleadings on file herein
relative to their Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss and respectfully request that the appellate
body further review all such pleadings. The purpose of Respondents' Request is to seek
reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's Order or Ruling of August 29,1989, as it is
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impossible that the Division could have subject-matter jurisdiction over these proceedings
and to proceed when the Division lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is a waste of time.
money and energy on the part of all parties, aside from being unlawful. Respondents thus
have the right to exhaust all administrative remedies in regard to this jurisdictional issue.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

3

ISSUE ON AGENCY REVIEW

11
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THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGED RULING
ON RESPONDENTS' RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION
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Under the "Non-Delegation DoctrineH in
Administrative Law. the August 29 Order
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Based on the Division's own "enabling statute",
the Division lacks power and authority to
regulate in a manner that conflicts with and
supersedes the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
and therefore, the Order of August 29. which
erroneously concludes the contrary, must be
reversed.
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Because the August 29.1989 Order "conflicts"
with the rules and regulations promulgated under
the Securities Exchange Act. including §28{a)
thereof, it Is preempted by federal law and
therefore, the Order of August 29 is erroneous
as a matter of law and must be reversed.

19

The Judge's Order of August 29 is non-responsive
and otherwise fails to address the specific issue
before it. namely whether the Division has the
kind of subject matter jurisdiction which Congress
has exclusively delegated to federal courts, and
therefore it must be vacated.

25
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The Order appealed from contains irrelevant and
erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of
law and otherwise tends to address the merits of
the Division's case, and therefore it should be
vacated.

26

The August 29. Order erroneously concludes that
the Division has power and authority to give
extra-territorial effect to its March 1. Order.
an interpretation which is not in the Order itself
and which further violates the Division's enabling
act, the Exchange Act. and the Supremacy and
Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.
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CONCLUSION

33

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

34
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

1. Respondents are in the securities brokerage business. They are therefore
registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.. f NASD"), a selfregulatory organization f SRO") and national securities association. The NASD, by
Congressional mandate, is exclusively governed by the Securities Exchange Commission
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §78o-3. In 1983, Congress amended
§15(b)(8M9) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and completely did away with SECO, an
alternative SRO to the NASD. Because of the 1983 amendment and because Respondents
are not members of any national securities exchange, they must, as a matter of law, be
members of the NASD. (See §15 and S15A of the Exchange Act and H.R. Rep. No. 98-106.
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).) As members of the NASD, Respondents are required by law
to obey its rules and regulations, including its Rules of Fair Practice. 15 U.S.C. §78o-3(b)(7).
(This also means that the Division's argument at the hearing on Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss that the NASD is a "club" of all things, an agrument apparently believed by the
Administrative Law Judge, is an abject misstatement of the law.)
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2. It is undisputed that Interpretation and enforcement of duties, liabilities.
and obligations under NASD and SEC rules and regulations are preempted under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.1 (See
§15. S15A. §27 and §28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.) It is further significant
that the express purpose of the Exchange Act is to regulate the -trading'' of securities in
interstate commerce — the only issue subject to Respondents' Request for Agency Review.
3. Prior to March 1.1989. Respondent Johnson-Bowles sold several thousand
shares of the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation to several out-of-state NASD
member broker-dealers and one clearing corporation. At the time of such sales,
Johnson-Bowles did not physically possess such securities. This is known in the industry as
"selling short" and is not only not unlawf ul or improper, but it is a common, every day
occurrance in the industry. (See Respondents' Memorandum in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss on file herein. %2 thereof.) It is also undisputed that these sales by Johnson-Bowles
to out-of-state NASD members and a registered clearing corporation are and were
governed by the NASD. Further, none of the entities to whom Johnson-Bowles sold such
stock prior to March 1. do business In the state of Utah and they are therefore not subject
to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Utah Securities Division.
4. On March 1.1989. the Division, based solely on the outcome of a lawsuit
Johnson-Bowles had previously filed in federal court, issued an Order suspending all state
exemptions for the offer and sale of securities of U.S.A. Medical In the state of Utah. A true
and correct copy of such Order Is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

1

For an Informative discussion of the NASD and how 1t 1s regulated by the SEC and
must, as a matter of law, comply with all the provisions of the Exchange Act. Its own rules, and
tfie~ru1es of both the SEC and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), reference Is made
to Austin Municipal Securities, Inc. v. NASD. 757 F.2d 676, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 192.027 (5th Clr.

Ct.~5T App. 1985T)
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5. It is undisputed that the Division's Order of March 1 makes no mention of
"purchases" nor does it. by its own terms, prohibit purchases by an NASD member to
consummate outstanding NASD contracts entered into prior to the date of such Order.
6. It is also undisputed that an SEC Release, a true and correct copy of which
Is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". specifically permits a broker-dealer to consummate
outstanding securities contracts during even a federal, SEC trading suspension order. As
NASD members. Respondents have a right to rely on such Exchange Act Release.
7. It is further undisputed that an exemption for the "purchase" of a security is
not required under any state or federal law and that therefore, the Division's Order did not
and could not prohibit "purchases" by Respondents for any purpose, let alone the express
purpose of fulfilling their Exchange Act obligations.
8. Article III, §1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice requires a broker-dealer to
honor its securities transactions or it may be subject to severe penalties, including
substantial fines, suspension, and even expulsion from the NASD. (See NASD Manual (CCH)
12151 at p.2013-3 (May. 1989). In Respondents' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of
their Motion to Dismiss on file herein. Respondents have cited authority in which NASD
members have been severely fined, suspended, or expelled for failure to honor their
Exchange Act trades.
9. Article III of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice further requires a
broker-dealer to deliver securities to its buying broker-dealer within a fixed number of days
of the date of the sale. (See, e.g.. NASD Manual (CCH). 52181 at p. 2123-3 (May. 1988) and
Appendix B thereto.)
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10. Based on Respondents' obligations as NASD members to honor their
pre-March 1 securities transactions with out-of-state entities and based on the fact that
the Division's Order neither prohibited "purchases'* nor purchases to fulfill outstanding
Exchange Act obligations. Respondents "purchased" a sufficient number of U.S.A. Medical
securities from certain Utah residents for this exclusive and avowed purpose of delivery. It
is further undisputed that Respondents did not "solicit" the sale of U.S.A. Medical stock
from Utah residents to themselves after March 1 as set forth in copies of letters from such
individuals on file herein. Further, as a matter of law, a broker-dealer cannot "solicit" a
"sale" but only a "purchase." (See e.g.. Rule 144(g)(2) of the General Rules and Regulations of
the Commission. Reg. §230.144. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) *2705A at p. 2788; Upton.
Broker-Dealer Regulation. Clark Boardman Securities Law Series. Vol. 15, §3.03[3][d][i]( p.
3-95. ("... the prohibition on solicitation of customers applies only to the solicitation of
buy orders, rather than the solicitation of sell orders."). It is noteworthy that on the basis of
the foregoing realization on the part of the Division, namely that its March 1. Order did not
prohibit "purchases", the Division, in July, amended its Petitions and dropped the specific
allegation that Respondents in fact violated its Order of March 1.
11. The U.S.A. Medical securities so purchased after March 1 were delivered
by Respondents to the various out-of-state entities to whom Respondents owed such
securities and such securities were "accepted" by them in accordance with NASD and SEC
rules, including Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code governing Investment Securities.
It is further undisputed that such entities were aware of the Division's March 1. Order and
U.S. District Judge Greene's ruling discussed below and yet they each and all accepted
"delivery" by Respondents after March 1. regardless. [Emphasis added.]

_6_
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12. It is undisputed that "delivery" of such securities to out-of-state entities in
satisfaction of Respondents' outstanding NASD and SEC obligations did not effect a
"distribution" of U.S.A. Medical securities to Utahns or anyone else (as the securities had
already been "sold" out-of-state prior to March 1. and delivery was but a ministerial act
undertaken to "even out" Respondent Johnson-Bowies' "open" accounts with such entities.)
13. Based on the Division's unilateral interpretation of its own March 1. Order
that such Order prohibited "purchases" from Utah residents for the sole purpose of
completing Respondents' out-of-state, federal obligations, the Division, on April 27.
brought the instant administrative proceedings against Respondents. Such Petitions were
amended by the Division in July and generally allege that Respondents' "purchase" of U.S.A.
Medical securities from Utah residents after March 1. is a "dishonest or unethical practice"
under §61-1-6(1) and (2). Utah Code Ann. — a "practice" which allegedly justifies revocation
of Respondents' registrations with the Division as broker-dealers and agents. Saying it
another way. Respondents' noble and legitimate efforts to honor and fulfill their federal
NASD and SEC obligations after March 1. which neither damaged nor had any effect on Utah
residents or the purpose behind the Division's Order (designed only to protect Utah
residents), apparently justifies, in the Division's view, putting Respondents completely out of
business through the instant proceedings.
14. After the Division's Order of March 1. Respondent Marlen V. Johnson had
numerous conversations with the NASD in Denver and was informed by Kenneth Schaeffer.
Assistant Director, that Respondents' failure to honor their outstanding NASD contracts by
delivering U.S.A. Medical stock would be violative of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice and
could subject Respondents to serious disciplinary action by the NASD. (See Exhibit "C"
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attached hereto and incorporated by reference, an affidavit to this effect which is part of
the record in these proceedings.)
15. It is noteworthy that on February 16,1989, prior to the Division's March 1,
Order, Respondent Johnson-Bowles brought a 10b-5 securities fraud action in federal
court against U.S.A. Medical and its "control persons'1 for market manipulation and the
orchestration of a so-called "short squeeze" which had caused Johnson-Bowies' extensive
"short position" in the securities of U.SA Medical. Such case was assigned to U.S. District
Court Judge J. Thomas Greene and is denominated by Case No. C-89-157-G. In such
Complaint, Johnson-Bowles, as Plaintiff, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to the
effect that the court declare Respondents' outstanding contracts in the securities of U.S.A.
Medical "void" or "voidable" because t>f the illegal conduct of the U.S A Medical
Co-Conspirators. After a two-day preliminary injunction hearing on February 27 and 28.
Judge Greene, while ruling that the securities of U.S A Medical had been the subject of
securities fraud and market manipulation, did not grant Johnson-Bowles' a preliminary
injunction and in effect ruled that Respondents had no choice whatsoever but to honor their
federal NASD and SEC obligations.
16. Based on a U.S. District Judge's ruling — a ruling which has the obvious
force and effect of federal law — and Respondents' unequivocal Exchange Act obligations,
Respondents purchased U.S A Medical securities as aforesaid for the sole purpose of
completing their outstanding, out-of-state contracts. For this reason and others set forth
hereinbelow, the Division's Amended Petitions, based on their capricious and bizarre
interpretation of their own March 1. Order are not only in conflict with NASD and SEC rules
and regulations, but they are in further conflict with Judge Greene's ruling that such
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contracts were neither "void" nor "voidable". It Is also significant that based on the
testimony adduced at the preliminary injunction hearing before Judge Greene, virtually all of
the stock of U.SA Medical was and had been "boxed" in the state of Utah and therefore, it
would have been impossible for Respondents to have purchased U.S.A. Medical stock
outside of the state of Utah to fulfill their outstanding federal obligations. Further, such
would have required Respondents to "solicit" out-of-state residents to sell stock to
Respondents as Utah residents in arguable violation of the Division's March 1. Order — an
argument ironically presented by the Division at the hearing on Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss.
17. On July 3.1989. Respondents moved the Division, in these proceedings, for
an Order under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the Division lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant proceedings. Respondents argued orally and in
such Motion and Supporting and Reply Memoranda that the Division's Petitions and
Amended Petitions were in direct conflict with NASD and SEC requirements over which
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the Exchange Act. Based on this diametric
conflict. Respondents argued that the Division had no power or authority under its own
"enabling statute" or otherwise to discipline an NASD member for obeying, complying, or
attempting to comply with such exclusive federal obligations under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. It is particularly noteworthy that §28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
specifically prohibits a state from regulating in a manner that "conflicts" with the Exchange
Act. (See discussion hereinbelow.)
18. Respondents' July 3. Motion was denied by the Administrative Law Judge
by Order of August 29. 1989, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit
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"D". It is this Order which is the subject of the present Request for Agency Review on the
various assignments of error stated therein.
19. Lastly. Respondents have been required to vigorously resist the Division's
Amended Petitions in that the Division has extortivefy and unreasonably demanded
settlement from Respondents as follows:
a.

A one month suspension for Respondent Marlen V. Johnson;

b.

An additional six month probationary period for Respondent Marlen V.
Johnson;

c.

A six month probationary period for Respondent Johnson-Bowles; and

d.

A $25,000 fine from each Respondent or a total of $50,000.

The foregoing settlement demand has ironically been proffered by the Division even though,
as a matter of law. it has no power or authority whatsoever to extract or demand "fines"
from Respondents. (See §61-1-etseq.) The foregoing is further not to lose sight of the
fact that Johnson-Bowles would be hard-pressed to operate for a month during a
suspension of its registered principal Marlen V. Johnson and therefore, the Division's
unlawful revocation actions and settlement demands are extortive and maliciously designed
to put Respondents out-of-business and for no other reason or purpose. In addition, the
foregoing settlement offer has been further extended by the Division when it cannot point
to one single, solitary Utah resident who has been damaged in any way by the conduct of
Respondents and when Respondents single-handedly took it upon themselves to uncover
the entire U.SA Medical fraud in federal court — something that the Division itself was
unable and unwilling to do in February 1989. To be sure, had it not been for Respondent
Johnson-Bowles' uncovering of the U.S A Medical fraud in Judge Qreene's court, the
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Division would never have entered or been able to enter its Order of March 1 to protect
Utah residents from subsequent unlawful distributions.
ISSUE ON AGENCY REVIEW
Whether the Division's ruling on August 29.1989. is erroneous in concluding
that the Division has power and authority to regulate and discipline Respondents (federal
licensees and NASD members) in a manner that diametrically "conflicts* and is inconsistent
with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over which federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.
(Respondents incorporate herein by reference their items of assignment of
error as set forth in their formal Request for Agency Review on file herein. Respondents, in
the interests of non-duplication, further incorporate by reference their other pleadings on
file herein that were before the Administrative Law Judge.)
ARGUMENT
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S RULING
ON RESPONDENTS' RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION
TO DISMISS DATED AUGUST 29.1989 IS ERRONEOUS
AS A SIMPLE MATTER OF LAW AND MUST BE REVERSED
A. Under the ''Non-Delegation Doctrine" in Administrative Law, the August 29
Order or Ruling is erroneous and must be reversed.
The Administrative Law Judge's Order of August 29. is violative of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This is because Congress has specifically delegated the
power and authority to regulate interstate trading of securities to the SEC and the NASD
thereunder. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.15 U.S.CA 977aa. provides
that any suit "to enforce any liability or duty created by this Chapter [the '34 Act]* must be
brought in a U.S. District Court. The present tribunal is certainly not a district court of the
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United States. Section 27 broadly encompasses all suits to enforce or interpret "any...
duty created by" the Act. [Emphasis added.] Leroy. Attorney General of the State of Idaho
v. Great Western United Corp., U.S. Sup. Ct. (CCH) [78 -'81 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L.
Rptr. (CCH) 171.488 at p.68.611 (Justice White). In this regard, what "duty" could be more
applicable to the Exchange Act than the very Exchange Act duty and obligation to complete
brokerage transactions under Act III, Sec. I of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice? Because the
dispute in this case goes to the very existence and purpose of SEC and NASD rules, the
Division's efforts to punish and prohibit compliance with SEC and NASD rules and
regulations is a usurpation of power and authority not delegated to it.
Section 28(a) of the Act provides in part that:
Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions)
of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does
not conflict with the provisions of this title or the rules and
regulations thereunder. [Emphasis added.]
15 U.S.C.A. §78bb(a). Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act thus imposes an "affirmative duty"
on states, not to regulate inconsistently with federal mandate, the violation of which must
be redressed in the federal courts under §27. Leroy, supra at p.68,607. In short, the
purpose of §28(a) was to leave the states with as much leeway to regulate securities
transactions as the Supremacy Clause would allow them (in the absence of such a
provision). Leroy, supra at p. 68.608. note 13. In this case, the several states have not been
delegated authority to regulate or enforce state administrative orders contrary to Article III,
§1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice or any other SEC or NASD rule or regulation.
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That the NASD and SEC and their concomitant rules and regulations are
embraced by the Act is specifically set forth in §15 and 15A of the Act. The Utah Court of
Appeals has recently confirmed the exclusiveness of interpreting NASD and SEC rules and
regulations in the case of Western Capital & Securities, Inc. v. Knudsving, (Ut. Ct. of App..
Case No. 880198-CA, Feb. 7.1989) [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH).
594.337. This and other authorities, including the specific provisions of the Exchange Act
as cited by Respondents in their Supporting Memoranda below, have been totally and
inexcusably ignored by the Administrative Law Judge in making his August 29. ruling.
The Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the federal Constitution, and most,
if not all state Constitutions, impose limits upon the legislature's actions. (See People v.
Green. 1 U. 11 (holding that the Utah legislature may not. under Article VI, Sec. 1. of Utah's
constitution, encroach upon the provisions of the federal Constitution and further holding
that the legislature has no power to increase or diminish powers of any federal court in this
state).) Nonetheless, the Division has brazenly taken upon itself the unlawful task of
regulating and disciplining Respondents for totally obeying their Exchange Act obligations
as specifically required of them thereunder.
The non-delegation doctrine in administrative law provides that a legislature
may not delegate full legislative powers to an agency that is repugnant to the Constitution.
The source of the doctrine is in the Constitution itself. Article 1, Section 1 provides that "all
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in the Congress of the United States
". Based on the non-delegation principle, state legislatures cannot confer duties and
authorities on administrative agencies that are repugnant to the federal Constitution or
federal enactments. To be sure, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Art. IV. cl. 2.
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provides that if a state law conflicts with federal law, federal law necessarily prevails.
Based on this delegation of power, the existence of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
creates the right not to be subject to conflicting state regulation. [Emphasis
added.] Leroy. supra at p. 68.611. Viewed from the perspective of state officials, the
existence of the Exchange Act creates a duty in such individuals not to undertake
conflicting regulation efforts. Nevertheless, the instant proceedings could not be more
diametrically conflicting with SEC and NASD rules mandating a broker-dealer and NASD
member to honor its trades. To be sure, it is impossible that Respondents could have
complied with their NASD and SEC obligations and the Division's unilateral interpretation of
its own order at the same time. [Emphasis added.]
Because the power to regulate trading of securities in interstate commerce
has been expressly delegated by Congress to the federal courts and the SEC and the NASD
under the Exchange Act. it is inconceivable if not ludicrous that the exact same power could
be simultaneously delegated to the Utah legislature to in turn second-handedly delegate to
a state administrative agency such as the Division.
The important component of non-delegation is the issue of to whom the
decision-making power is given. This aspect of non-delegation recently figured in a very
important decision. Bowsher v. Synar. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). overturning a balanced
budget statute known as the Graham-Rudman-Hollings Act. In Bowsher. the U.S. Supreme
Court flatly said:
To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute laws
would be. in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress
could simply remove or threaten to remove, an officer for
executing the laws in a fashion found unsatisfactory to
Congress. This kind of congressional control over the execution
of the laws . . . is unconstitutionally impermissible.

-14-

coo

By the same token. Congress has not delegated Exchange Act authority to the Utah
legislature to in turn delegate the same authority to the Utah Securities Division to, in its
turn, inconsistently regulate and enforce that which specifically and exclusively comes under
the Exchange Act. Because the decision-making power to regulate trading in the
over-the-counter securities markets in interstate commerce has been expressly delegated
to the SEC and NASD under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. the Division has no
jurisdiction to regulate Respondents, inconsistently or at all. in this regard. Unfortunately.
this is what the Division is doing and what the August 29. Order says it can do. Moreover.
the preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that it is:
An Act to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and
of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign
commerce and throughlhe mails, to prevent inequitable and
unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other
purposes.
Based on the foregoing, it is impossible as a matter of law that the Division has jurisdiction
to bring proceedings repugnant to federal law and therefore, the Administrative Law
Judge's Order of August 29. is erroneous and must be reversed forthwith.
B. Based on the Division's own "enabling statute", the Division lacks power and
authority to regulate in a manner that conflicts with and supersedes the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. and therefore, the Order of August 29. which erroneously concludes
the contrary, must be reversed.

z
For a detail of the Suprene Court's discussion of non-delegatlon, see Panama
Refining Co. y. Ryan. 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Co. v. Un1ted"5taTesT?95 U.S.
495 (19J5). In these cases, the Supreme Court used the non-delegation doctrine to strike down
two separate portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA). This case,
however, 1s a wore conspicuous violation of non-delegation 1n that Congress has never delegated
authority to the Division, through the Utah legislature, to regulate, or even regulate
Inconsistently, that which I t has specifically delegated to the SEC and the NASO under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §78.
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Delegation, as discussed above, should not be confused with the ultra vires
doctrine. This doctrine asks whether an agency is functioning within its statutory powers.
[Emphasis added.] The easy way to distinguish these two issues is to keep in mind that the
non-delegation principle involves a look the face of the agency's enabling act and does not
normally inquire into subsequent actions taken by the agency's administrator. Ultra vires,
by contrast, presumes that the agency's enabling act contains a proper standard (i.e.. that
it is constitutional on its face), and then investigates subsequent agency action to see if
that action is authorized by the enabling act.
The Division's enabling statute relative to these proceedings is contained in
§61-1-6(1). Utah Code Ann. Quite clearly, this enabling statute or clause does not give the
Division power or authority to revoke the registration of a broker-dealer or agent for
complying or attempting to comply with superseding SEC and/or NASD rules. It does not
say that the Division can override or supersede the SEC and NASD rules in acting to suspend
or revoke the registration of a Utah broker-dealer and NASD member. It does not say that
compliance with SEC and NASD rules and regulations under the Exchange Act creates a
basis on which a broker-dealer or agent can be simultaneously subject to a state revocation
proceeding. The statute states but nine (9) grounds on which the Division may act to revoke
a broker-dealer or agent's license, none of which are remotely applicable to the interstate
conduct of Respondents. To be sure, the statute clearly does not say that unambiguous
SEC and NASD rules, designed to facilitate trading of securities in interstate commerce, can
be capriciously deemed by the Division as "dishonest or unethical practices". On the
contrary, had Respondents deemed the Division's March 1. Order as superseding federal law
and preventing consummation of their out-of-state trades, and. as a result thereof, had
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Respondents ignored express Exchange Act obligations. Respondents would have been
accused by the NASD and SEC of engaging in "dishonest or unethical practices." See 15
U.S.C. §78o-3(b)(7).
This point is buttressed by §61-1-24, Utah Code Ann., which requires the
Division, with respect to rules, forms, and orders to cooperate with the Securities Exchange
Commission with the view to achieving maximum uniformity. [Emphasis added.] Further,
§61-1-27. Utah Code Ann., directly conflicts with the position of the Division in regard to
these proceedings. Section 61-1-27 provides:
This Chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general
purpose as to make uniform the law of those states which enact
it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this
Chapter with the related federal regulation. [Emphasis added.]
Contrary to §61-1-27, the Division's existing actions are repugnant to any "coordinating" of
its interpretation and administration of §61-1-6 "with the related federal regulation". Quite
literally, it is impossible to imagine a set of circumstances under which conduct by a state
would not be more conflicting with a federal regulatory scheme.
If an agency is acting outside its jurisdictional limits, it is said to be functioning
in a ultra vires manner. The authority of courts to review jurisdictional questions of this
kind relative to agencies like the Division was firmly established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Crowell v. Benson, 286 U.S. 22 (1932). The term ultra vires is borrowed from corporate law
and must be sharply distinguished from the delegation doctrine. A delegation analysis looks
at the face of the enabling act and asks whether the statute itself contains a proper
standard curbing unfettered agency discretion. By constrast, the ultra vires doctrine
assumes there is a proper delegation in the statute, and then analyzes a specific action
taken by the agency to determine whether that action is within the limits set by its enabling
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&ct. In this instance, the Division's petitions must be overturned and dismissed because
such petitions are clearly outside the agency's boundaries. Board of Governors. Federal
Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp.. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986). As the Supreme Court
in Board of Governors, put it: "If the statute is clear and unambiguous (with regard to an
agency's authority), that is the end of the matter

" In this case, there is no ambiguity in

statutory interpretation. Even a cursory review of the express language of §61-1-6(1). Utah
Code Ann., evidences that the Division cannot take action to discipline a broker-dealer or
agent for obeying Exchange Act mandates. This would turn the Supremacy and Commerce
Clauses on their heads which is exactly what the August 29. Order does. For this reason,
the Administrative Law Judge's August 29.1989 decision could not be more erroneous,
even under the ultra vires doctrine. Going further, however, it could not be more selfevident that neither Congress nor Utah's legislature have delegated authority to the Division
to unilaterally interpret its own orders inconsistently with or in a manner that overrides
Exchange Act rules and obligations.3 Thus one can see the compounded error of the
August 29. Order.
It Is also undisputed that the Division is an agent of the Utah courts and even a
Utah District Court has no jurisdiction to address the Exchange Act issues presented in this
dase. See Western Capital, supra, a recent Utah Court of Appeals decision embracing this
point precisely. For this reason alone, the Order of August 29 is erroneous as the Division

J
I t 1s readily arguable that the Division acted Improperly by proceeding against
Respondents with adjudication when 1t should have proceeded by rulemaking, thereby giving
Respondents and those similarly situated actual notice of how i t would suddenly Interpret Its
March 1 , Order. However, this due process argument goes to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and 1s not
germane to the Jurisdictional Issue on review. The Order of August 29, erroneously assumes that
the Division's March 1, Order somehow proscribed "purchases" by NASD members to complete
outstanding contracts and that such constitutes a violation of §61-1-6(1)(g). Utah Code Ann.
Such a conclusion 1s not only repugnant to the Division's own enabling statute, but i t 1s~Turther
constitutionally repugnant to the Division's own power and authority to self-servlngly Interpret
Its own orders.
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has no such authority as an agent of Utah Courts. See, e.g.. State v. Mechem. 316 P.2d
1069 (N. Mex. S. Ct. 1957) (holding that workers* compensation actions may only be tried in
a court, not by an agency, because those actions are exclusive within the court's judicial
power). Similarly, it is quite impossible that the Division could conceivably try issues as to
Exchange Act obligations when a Utah state court itself has no such authority, power, or
jurisdiction.
C. Because the August 29,1989 Order "conflicts" with the rules and
regulations promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act, including §28(a) thereof, it is
preempted by federal law and therefore, the Order of August 29 is erroneous as a matter of
law and must be reversed.
The Pre-emption Doctrme is an additional basis on which the Order of August
29 should be reversed and the instant administrative proceedings dismissed. When
Congress exercises a granted power, concurrent conflicting state legislation may be
challenged via the Preemption Doctrine. The Supremacy Clause. Art. IV. cl. II. mandates that
federal law overrides, i.e.. preempts any state regulation where there is an actual conflict
between the two sets of legislation such that both cannot stand, for example, if federal law
forbids an act which state legislation requires or. the contrary thereof, which exists in this
case. In this case, federal law requires an act which not even state legislation, but mere
state agency order allegedly forbids. Certainly, a more concrete and offensively
conspicuous example of when and where the Preemption Doctrine applies could not exist.
In a leading Supreme Court case on the Preemption Doctrine, the court stated
that the test for preemption is whether under the circumstances of a particular case, the
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
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and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52. 67 (1941). The
Constitutional principle is simply that states and federal government should have a common
end in view, namely, to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official bodies
which might have some authority over the subject matter. Amalgamated Association of
Street, Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge. 403 U.S. 274 (1971). Where
there is no indicia of Congressional intent (i.e., a "dormant" Commerce Clause issue), a
court may have to balance the state and federal interest to achieve this end. Such is not
the case here as it would be ignoring the entire Exchange Act to declare otherwise or
engage in any balancing test. The August 29 Order fails to address or discuss
Congressional intent in the area of interstate, over-the-counter trading of securities and
had it done so, the Judge would necessarily have concluded that there is clear, concise, and
unambiguous legislative intent within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Schneiderwind v.
ANR Pipeline Company, 108 S.Ct. 1145. 485 U.S. 293 (March 22, 1988) (holding that a
preemption question requires an examination of Congressional intent and striking down a
State statute under the commerce clause for impinging on a federal regulatory scheme).
Based merely on the preamble to the '34 Act quoted above, there can be no dispute over
Congress' intent and no need for the Administrative Law Judge to balance state and federal
interests in this case. Nonetheless, the Administrative Law Judge concluded, in spite of
clear, unambiguous Congressional intent contained in the Exchange Act, that the Division
has subject-matter jurisdiction to regulate and discipline in conflict therewith.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have adopted a three prong inquiry to
establish pre-emption. They are generally:
(1)

The prevasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme;
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(2)

The federal occupation of the field as necessitated by the
need for national uniformity;

(3)

The danger of conflict between states laws and the
administration of the federal program.

Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497. 502-505 (1956). The progeny of Hines and Nelson
have continually narrowed the scope of judicial inquiry into a determination of whether.
under the particular facts of the case, the existence of the state regulatory scheme is
facilitative or detrimental to the purposes and objectives of the federal statute. In fact.
most preemption cases discuss state legislation as possibly being in conflict or inconsistent
with the federal scheme, not, as in this case, unilateral and reckless "state action" 180
degrees in conflict with a federal regulatory scheme. For instance, the Division seeks to
revoke Respondents' state registrations for allegedly engaging in "dishonest and unethical
practices." At the same time, the NASD, statutorily and through the SEC, is mandated to
secure compliance by its members with the federal securities laws as well as its own
regulations, which are themselves designed to promote "ethical business behavior." 15
U.S.C. §78o-3(b)(7). Respondents' conduct from a purely federal standpoint was indeed
"ethical". How then, can the very same conduct be deemed "unethical" from a state
Standpoint and yet there be no "conflict" between the regulatory schemes as the Division
argues? There can thus be no question that the instant proceedings are diametrically
opposed to the carrying-out of specific Congressional intent. If Congress intended states
to encroach upon areas specifically delegated by it to the SEC and NASD, why have no
states done such, either on their own or through their adoption of the Uniform Securities
Act. To be sure, §1904, taken together with §514 of the Uniform Securities Act compels
federal/state integration or harmonization and it should be noted that Utah has in fact
enacted the Uniform Act.
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Co-operation is also a two-way street. Thus, states may not. under the
Supremacy Clause, refuse to enforce valid federal laws even though such enforcement is in
state court. Testa v. Katt. 330 U.S. 368 (1947). Unfortunately, this is precisely what the
Division has arrogantly done, as if both the '34 Act did not exist and it had no bearing on
either the state of Utah or an administrative agency thereof. The only exception to the
foregoing is if Congress expressly or impliedly excuses a state from enforcing such federal
law. See ejj.. Douglas v. New York. N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377. 387-88 (1929). In this case,
Congress has not excused the Division or the state of Utah from enforcing SEC and NASD
mandates; Congress has never said a state can regulate in diametrical conflict with NASD
and SEC rules and regulations and yet such is precisely what the Division is doing and what
the Order of August 29. says the Divfson can do. In fact, one cannot imagine a greater,
more poignant conflict between state and federal law: if Respondents comply with NASD
and SEC rules they apparently engage in "dishonest or unethical practices" yet if they
comply with the Division's unilateral interpretation of its own order, they violate SEC and
NASD obligations, subjecting themselves to fine, suspension and expulsion from the
brokerage business, let alone costly arbitration with every out-of-state entity to whom they
owed stock. A more telling and flagrant example of a state agency's self-will run riot in
violation of the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution could not exist. The
August 29. Order is thus repugnant to the mandate of comity as further articulated in Art.
IV, Sees. 1 and 2 of the federal Constitution. See e ^ , Toomer v. Witsell. 334 U.S. 385. 395
i

(1948),
A discussion of preemption relative to the Exchange Act cannot be made
without reference to the significant Supreme Court case of Edgar v. Mite, U.S. Sup. Ct.
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[1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 198,728 (June 23,1982). In Edgar, the
Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether the Illinois Business Takeover
Act was unconstitutional under the Williams Act. a 1968 amendment to the Exchange Act.
After analyzing the protections afforded localities versus the burden imposed by the state
statute on interstate commerce, the Court concluded that the Illinois statute was
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and therefore preempted under the Exchange
Act. The Court held that the Commerce Clause precludes the application of a state law to
commerce that takes place outside a state's borders regardless of whether or not such
commerce has effects within the state. The state statute was thus declared
unconstitutional in that it imposed a burden on interstate commerce which was excessive in
light of the local interests the state statute was desiged to further. Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 US 137, 90 S.Ct. 844. The Division's present actions to put Respondents out of
business serve no purpose for the benefit of Utah residents when compared to the burdens
such actions impose on interstate commerce. In fact, the Division's Amended Petitions in
no way serve to protect Utah residents at all. If anything. Respondents have to some extent
ensured that thousands of shares of U.S.A. Medical are no longer subject to being sold to
Utah residents as such shares have been "exported" out of Utah. Would the Division rather
have all such stock still sitting here in Utah waiting to be re-distributed at some point to
Utah residents In violation of the Division's March 1, Order? if one balances the interest of
this locality in disciplining Respondents as against the burden imposed on several
out-of-state broker-dealers and a major clearing corporation, one must conclude that the
purely speculative nature of protection afforded by the Division's disciplinary actions
impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce — a burden which far outweighs any
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local putative benefits. Because the Division's actions seek to affect interstate commerce
and prohibit the facilitation of interstate commercial transactions — transactions already
undertaken and entered into by Respondents with out-of-state residents — such action by
the Division can hardly be said to affect interstate commerce only incidentally. Edgar v.
Mite, supra. Simply put. the Edgar court held that if a state law affects interstate securities
transactions, it violates the Exchange Act. The Division's actions are also clearly atypical of
everyday Blue Sky regulation in that the Division is seeking to directly regulate specific
interstate securities transactions that have already taken place across state lines. In fact.
Respondents' transactions, for which they are now defending revocation proceedings, are
interstate commerce. [Emphasis added.] Edgar, supra.
The Respondents are also being discriminated against as federal licensees and
NASD members merely because they are Utah residents. This kind of discrimination
characteristically invalidates a state law under the Commerce Clause because such state
action is based on impermissible protectionist intent or effect. L.P. Acqusition Co. v. Tyson.
['85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 192.271 (6th Cir. Ct. of App. 1985).
In sum. the Supreme Court has made no suggestion that S28(a). the savings
provision in the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §78bb(a)(1982)]. authorizes, in any way. state
violations of the Commerce Clause. Edgar, supra. In Public Utilities Commission v. United
Fuel Gas Co.. 317 U.S. 456,63 S.Ct 369. 87 L. Ed. 396 (1943). the Supreme Court upheld an
injunction against a state on the ground that a supplier suffered injury from enforcement of
a state's order for proof itself and that existence of complying with such orders was among
the contingencies against which Congress sought to guard against in creating exclusive
federal Jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.]
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The Division's only argument is that the instant proceedings come within its
legitimate police power. However, it is well settled in Utah that the mere declaration by the
legislature that an act is within the exercise of its police power is not binding on courts
unless the act Is specifically within the scope of such power. Utah Manufacturers' Assn. v.
Stewart. 82 U. 198. 23 P.2d 229. In addition. Art. I. Sec. 18 of the Utah Constitution
prevents a state from "impairing the obligation of contracts'*. While the Division argues in
this case that impairing Respondents' outstanding interstate brokerage contracts is within
its police power, such is not true. No Utahns have been damaged in any respect by the
conduct of Respondents and under Utah law the Division's right to impair contracts is
subject to such reasonable policing regulations as may be enacted to promote the public
good. Golding v. Shubach Optical Co.. 93 U. 32. 70 P.2d 871. For instance, no public good
is possibly served by putting Respondents out of business merely for fulfilling their
obligations as NASD members. On the other hand, surely it is not the Division's position that
it is compelled to discipline Respondents to protect them from themselves as in the case of
jay-walking — a crime within a state's police power for that very reason.
Based on the foregoing, the August 29, Order skirts the entire issue of
pre-emption and comity, ignoring the Exchange Act and Supremacy and Commerce Clauses
in their entirety, and erroneously concludes that the instant proceedings are within the
legitimate police power of the state of Utah when they are not. For these reasons, the
August 29. Order must be reversed and vacated and Respondents' motion to dismiss should
be granted without further delay.
D. The Judge's Order of August 29 is non-responsive and otherwise fails to
address the specific issue before it. namely whether the Division has the kind of subject
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matter Jurisdiction which Congress has exclusively delegated to federal courts, and
therefore It must be vacated.
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss was directed solely to the issue of whether or
not the Division has subject-matter Jurisdiction to override SEC and NASD rules and
regulations. This issue was not properly addressed by the Administrative Law Judge in the
August 29. Order, and in fact, the Judge erroneously treated Respondents9 Motion as one
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon its relief can be granted. Assuming the Division
has subject-matter Jurisdiction, which it could not. Respondents have little dispute with the
fact that the Division has the police power to revoke the registration of a broker-dealer or
agent for "dishonest or unethical practices*. This is clearly set forth In §61-1-6(1 )(g).
Contrary to Respondents' Motion, hbwever. the August 29. Order merely concludes that the
Division has stated a claim under §61-1-6(1 Kg). Utah Code Ann. Such is not and never was
the purpose of Respondents' Motion. Once it could be established, however, that the
Division has subject-matter Jurisdiction, the issue of whether or not the amended petitions
state a claim, constitutionally or otherwise, can be addressed.4 Unfortunately, these issues
are not now and never were before the Administrative Law Judge on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
and therefore the Order of August 29. is entirely non-responsive and irrelevant to the
specific Jurisdictional issue. Such Order should thus be reversed accordingly.
E. The Order appealed from contains irrelevant and erroneous findings of fact
and conclusions of law and otherwise tends to address the merits of the Division's case,
and therefore it should be vacated.

4

Respondents emphasize that the actual constitutionality of the Division's Amended
Petitions based on equal protection, due process, void for vagueness, and privileges and
Immunities, etc.. arguments are not at issue here and are more properly the prospective subject
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
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Respondents object to the August 29. Order in that it contains irrelevant and
erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of law which are neither admitted, pleaded, nor
in evidence. It also tends to improperly address the merits of the Division's case and
because it is non-responsive as outlined in the previous argument, it should be vacated.
For instance, the August 29. Order fails to find that Respondents are members of the NASD
and are subject to SEC and NASD rules and regulations specifically delegated to such
organizations by Congress under the Exchange Act. The Order further fails to find that
disputes, obligations, liabilities, and duties contemplated in the Exchange Act can only be
brought or determined in a federal court as unequivocally set forth in §27 thereof. It
further fails to find that the Division can inconsistently regulate a broker-dealer under the
present fact situtation without violating §28(a) of the Exchange Act. The Order further
erroneously holds that Respondents* "purchase** of shares of U.S.A. Medical corporation
stock to complete its outstanding federal obligations is a "willful failure** to comply with the
Division's March 1.1989. Summary Order suspending exemptions for the offer and sale of
such securities in Utah and only in Utah. Again, whether the March 1. Order prohibited
"purchases" is irrelevant to whether or not the Division has jurisdiction to regulate or
adjudicate contrary to the mandates of the Exchange Act.
The August 29. Order erroneously concludes on top of page 4 thereof that
"NASD rules of conduct [sic] should not be accorded the force and effect of federal law"
This startling conclusion is completely belied by S§15.15A. 27. and 28(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act. including Western Capital and Securities, supra. The Order further
erroneously concludes that the purchase of securities after March 1. 1989 merely to effect
delivery of securities previously "sokT to third parties was "squarely at odds with the
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operative effect of the March 1. 1989 Summary Order." As set forth in the Statement of
Material Facts above, no exemption is required to "purchase" securities and this conclusion
is further erroneous, let alone irrelevant, as a matter of state or federal law. The August
29. Order thus leads one to the erroneous conclusion that Respondents had actual notice of
how the Division would unilaterally interpret its March 1. Order. This is not true. Further, it
assumes that the Division acted properly in proceeding against Respondents by way of its
petitions as opposed to rulemaking and this again evidences that the Order treats
Respondents' Motion as one to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In short, the Order is
erroneous In concluding that "any necessary compliance by Respondents with NASD rules as
a member of that self-regulatory organization does not lend support to the conclusion that
the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case." Again, if a state court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction to address Exchange Act mandates and provisions, it is
malignantly preposterous to conclude that the Division, a mere agent of Utah courts, would
have such subject-matter jurisdiction. See §27 of the Exchange Act. By concluding that
Respondents' conduct was "squarely at odds with the operative effect of the March 1.1989
Summary Order", the Administrative Law Judge has further made a determination which
tends to go to the merits and which is beyond the scope of Respondents' Motion. In
addition, the August 29. Order further compels the erroneous legal conclusion that
Respondents' conduct effected an unlawful "distribution" to Utah residents as this Is the
only legal conclusion that would justify the Division's Amended Petitions under its police
powers. That Respondents effected an unlawful distribution to Utah residents is belied by
the facts as in point of fact, all stock purchased by Respondents was "exported"
out-of-state. Respondents' conduct therefore had no impact or relationship to Utah or

0005^
-28-

Utah residents. Simply put. the August 29. Order fails to properly address the simple
jurisdictional issue that was before such court.
F. The August 29. Order erroneously concludes that the Division has power
and authority to give extra-territorial effect to its March 1, Order, an interpretation which is
not in the Order itself and which further violates the Division's enabling act, the Exchange
Act, and the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.
One of the salient problems with the August 29. Order is that it erroneously
gives the Division's March 1. Order an unlawful extra-territorial effect on other states and
other state residents. The purpose of Respondents' post-March 1. purchases of U.S.A.
Medical stock was merely to fulfill interstate obligations. Such purchases had nothing to do
with Utah or Utah residents, nor didlt harm, damage, or injure any Utah residents. Certainly
those who sold their U.SA. Medical stock to Respondents are not complaining that they now
want their worthless stock back, nor would it conceivably appear that the Division is now
proceeding against Respondents on such sellers' behalf so as to protect them. Clearly, the
only reason Respondents had to purchase such securities from Utah residents is the simple
fact that virtually all of the outstanding U.S A Medical stock was in the state of Utah! This
is evidenced by the official record in the Judge Greene proceedings. Ironically, at the
hearing on Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the Division argued that a purchase by
Respondents from an out-of-state resident would not have changed the Division's position
in regard to Respondents' alleged "dishonest or unethical" conduct. For this reason, it is
clear that whether Respondents purchased the stock from Utah residents or not. the
August 29. Order holds that Respondents, as Utah residents, violated the Division's March 1.
Order and thereby engaged in "dishonest or unethical practices'*. To be sure, two of the
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parties from whom Respondents purchased securities who are identified in the Amended
Petitions are Sheldon and Lois Flateman. New York residents. At the hearing, the Division
argued that the Flatemans themselves violated the Division's March 1. Order. Such an
argument evidences that the Division considers its March 1, Order to have unlawful
extra-territorial effect by suspending exemptions in other states such as the state of New
York. This untenable and preposterous position is antithetical to well-settled conflicts of
law problems in the Blue Sky area. See Lintz v. Carey Manor. Ltd.. 613 F. Supp. 543. 550-51
(D.C. Va. 1985) (holding that two separtate states* Blue Sky laws cannot be interpreted as
being mutually exclusive). The foregoing also compels the inevitable legal conclusion that
any out-of-state entity which bought stock for the account of Johnson-Bowles after March
1. would have similarly violated the Division's March 1. Order. If this is so. then it would have
been impossible for Respondents to have ever honored their Exchange Act commitments
without violating the Division's March 1. Order.
The Division apparently attempts to obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over
these proceedings under §61-1-26 which provides that a transaction occurs in Utah if the
"buy" occurs here. Based on this contention, however, it would have been impossible for
Respondents, as Utah residents, to have purchased U.S.A. Medical stock from anyone,
anywhere, without having arguably violated the Division's March 1. Order and Its unlawful
and unilateral interpretation thereof. The foregoing results in but another necessary legal
conclusion that the Division's March 1.1989. Order has been given unlawful extra-territorial
effect by the Judge's Order of August 29. Certainly, under another state's Blue Sky laws, an
out-of-state resident has every right to sell his or her U.S.A. Medical stock to anybody he
wants, and if not. the Division is assuming power and authority no less expansive under the

C0055
-30-

Commerce Clause than the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (See Singer v.
Magnavox. cited in Respondents' Supporting Memoranda on file herein holding that It is
unlawful to give extra-territorial effect to a state's Blue Sky laws). It Is thus undisputed
that the Division's attempt to prevent Respondents from completing Interstate commerce
transactions has the practical effect of regulating and controlling conduct beyond the
boundaries of Utah in violation of the Commerce Clause. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.
325 U.S.761. 775 (1945). The limits on a state's power to enact substantive legislation are
similar to the limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts. In either case, "any attempt
'directly' to assert extra-territorial jurisdiction over persons or property would offend
sister States and exceed the inherent limits of a State's power." Schafer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186. 197(1977).
The second reason, alluded to above, why the August 29. Order unlawfully
gives extra-territorial effect to the Division's March 1. Order is that it would prohibit
"buy-ins" by the various out-of-state broker-dealers and clearing corporations "for the
account" of Johnson-Bowles. There is absolutely no difference between Johnson-Bowles'
purchase of U.S.A. Medical stock to cover its "short position" or the purchase by its clearing
agents of U.S.A. Medical stock "for its own account". In other words, the necessary legal
conclusion that must be drawn from the August 29. Order and the Division's position in that
regard is that any "buy-ins" for Johnson-Bowles' account would have just as readily
resulted in a violation of the Division's March 1. Order. In other words, what difference
does it make who buys the stock if it is for Johnson-Bowles? Such a violation would
apparently be not only on the part of Johnson-Bowles but also on the part of each
out-of-state entity which the Division has no authority or jurisdiction to regulate. This is
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again because Johnson-Bowles is a Utah resident and it makes no difference whether
Johnson-Bowles purchased the stock itself or such was purchased by someone else for its
own account from the state of Utah or anywhere else. It makes absolutely no difference.
The August 29, Order erroneously affirms the Division's jurisdiction to prevent
out-of-state broker-dealers and clearing corporations or agents from "evening our their
accounts with Johnson-Bowles — an obviously unlawful extra-territorial effect violative of
the Commerce Clause. While the August 29, Order infers that Johnson-Bowles should have
allowed such "buy-ins", the Judge forgets that the subject out-of-state entities would have
had to purchase stock from the state of Utah inasmuch as virtually all of the stock of U.S.A.
Medical was in the state of Utah. This is further not to ignore that had Respondents
allowed the out-of-state brokers and clearing agents to purchase U.S.A. Medical stock at
any price they could get it. Respondents would have been out of business as
Johnson-Bowles hadn't the capital to afford open-ended "buy-ins". For this reason, the
fact that Johnson-Bowles purchased the stock itself for its own account as opposed to
negligently allowing someone else to purchase it for its own account is a distinction without
any difference. The August 29. Order concluded the contrary and is thus further error
justifying reversal and the granting of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss.
The August 29. Order confers an additional extra-territorial effect on the
March 1. Order. This is because such Order is construed as permitting the halting of
trading of over-the-counter securities on an exclusively interstate basis as evidenced in
this case. Unfortunately for the Division, any authority to halt over-the-counter trading is
exclusively reserved to the NASD in SEC Ex. Act Rel. 25. 669. 40 SEC Dock.1123 (1988).
Therefore, the Division's Order is in further conflict with SEC and NASD rules and
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regulations, the specific power and authority over which Is exclusively delegated to federal
courts, not the Division, under the Exchange Act. The Division's Order, as interpreted by it.
thus encroaches upon the NASD's exclusive trading suspension authority. Again, these
points mandate that the instant proceedings be dismissed and that the August 29. Order be
reversed.
Based on the fact that the August 29. Order unlawfully gives extra-territorial
effect to the Division's March 1. Order, such Order and the instant administrative
proceedings themselves are violative of the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution. Thus, the Administrative Law Judge's Order must be vacated.
CONCLUSION
When Congress tells Respondents to stand, the Divison is disciplining them for
not sitting; when Congress tells Respondents to leap, the Division seeks to discipline them
for not lying down; when Congress has told Respondents that honoring their trades is an
"ethical" mandate or the NASD will subject them to severe penalties, the Division has told
them such is "unethical" or "dishonest" and their licenses will be revoked. No regulation
could conceivably be more conflicting or paint anyone into a greater corner from which he
or she cannot extricate themselves.
If Respondents' conduct is "unethical- or "dishonest", even in light of the
Exchange Act, Respondents would like to know who the mysterious person is who is the
recipient of such alleged "unethical" or "dishonest" behavior. Surely, its not a Utah resident
or anyone else and the Division has yet to identify any such phantom who needs the
protection of its alleged "police power".
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Since preemption and comity come into play as a matter of law when a state
regulation or activity conflicts with a federal mandate and subjects someone like
Respondents to conflicting regulation, the Administrative Law Judge's ruling on
Respondents' motion to dismiss is fundamental error and must be reversed. If not. the
instant proceedings wilt continue to subject Respondents to incurring additional irreparable
damage to their business, including unwarranted attorney's fees, all of which are wholly
unnecessary in law. fact, or reality.
DATED this 11th day of September. 1)

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of September. 1989.
(s)he hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN
SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW AND HEARING THEREON to John C. Baldwin,
Director and Kathleen C. McGinley. Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities Division.
Utah Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge and presiding officer J. Stephen Eklund, Esq..
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah
84145-0802; and mailed the same to Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General. 115
State Capitol. Salt Lake City. Utah 84114; and Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. Callister. Duncan.
& Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor. Kennecott BIdg.. 10 East South Temple
Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 84133.
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENTS
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION
TO DISMISS

CRD NO. 07678
Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION OF:
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON

Case No. SD-89-47AG

CRD NO. 2598888

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

Marian Vernon Johnson, on his oath, deposes and says the following on behalf of
respondents in the above-entitled matters ^nd in support of their motion to dismiss on file
herein:
1. That your affiant is a respondent In the above-matters and he has personal
knowledge of that which is contained herein. He is also a principal of Johnson-Bowles

EXHIBIT

k

Company. Inc.. also a respondent in these matters, and he has power and authority to make
this affidavit on its behalf.
2. That your affiant is a registered principal and registered representative with the
National Association of Securities Dealers. Inc. ("NASD"), a self-regulatory organization
governed exclusively under the express provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
3. That respondent Johnson-Bowles Company Inc. is a broker-dealer registered,
licensed with, and specifically regulated by the NASD as further exclusively governed under
the express provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
4. That after Johnson-Bowles filed a lawsuit in federal court on February 16.1989
against U.SA Medical Corporation, et al.. case no. C-89-157-G. in an effort to uncover the
so-called "short squeeze** orchestrated by named-defendants therein, your affiant was in
regular and continual contact with the NASD in Denver, specifically with one Kenneth
Schaeffer. the NASD Regional Office Assistant Director.
5. That your affiant kept Mr. Schaeffer fully informed of the federal case and
furnished him personally with copies of the Complaint. Judge J. Thomas Greene's formal
order of February 28.1989. and also the Utah Securities Division's Order of March 1. the
latter of which is the sole subject of the Instant proceedings.
6. That subsequent to March 1.1989. your affiant had numerous conversations with
Assistant Director Schaef fer about Johnson-Bowies' "short position" In the securities of
U.S A Medical and your affiant can attest that Mr. Schaef fer was fully advised In all
particulars and at all times. On nearly each occasion. Mr. Schaef fer reminded your affiant

00067
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of respondents' obligations to fulfill and consummate their outstanding brokerage
contracts as required under the NASO Rules of Fair Practice.
7. That even though Mr. Schaeffer was aware of the Division's March 1, 1989 Order.
Mr. Schaeffer specifically informed your affiant in no uncertain terms that respondents
must fulfill their overriding NASD obligations or face possible serious disciplinary action.
That such warnings were understood by your affiant to not exclude expulsion from the
NASD — the result of which would mean the end of respondents* business as being in good
stead with the NASD is the lif eblood of any broker-dealer.
8. That based on your affiant's unequivocal conversations with Mr. Schaeffer and
because respondents are directly and daily regulated by the NASD in all particulars, your
affiant believed respondents had no choice whatsoever but to purchase U.SA Medical
stock to consummate their outstanding Exchange Act transactions in such securities —
transactions that had each and all been entered into prior to the date of the Division's
March 1. Order. In other words, in light of the present state administrative proceedings,
respondents have relied to their detriment on the warnings and admonitions of the NASD by
and through Mr. Schaeffer. Further, your affiant was aware of the SEC Interpretative
Release attached to respondents' Supporting Memorandum as Exhibit "ET and was under
the obviously reasonable impression that respondents' conduct was permissible under the
federal regulatory scheme without question.
9. That your affiant never interpreted the Division's March 1. Order — the exclusive
subject of these proceedings —as prohibiting or even remotely relating to respondents'
obligations to complete their outstanding brokerage contracts. To be sure, the Division's
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Petitions are belied by the very language of the Order itself. Further, that at no time were
respondents advised by counsel, the Division, the SEC. the NASD, or anyone else that
fulfilling their outstanding NASD contracts would or even could be deemed a violation of the
Division's March 1. Order — an Order which relates only to sales or offers to sell. This is
particularly true when the SEC. the NASD, and the Securities Division were well aware and
fully apprised of all that was transpiring in the U.S.A. Medical litigation. As a matter of fact,
the Division had two attorneys present on February 27 and 28 at the preliminary injunction
hearing before U.S. District Judge Greene. Further, your affiant believes that Mr. Schaeffer
similarly did not. by any stretch of the imagination, so misconstrue the Division's Order as
the Division itself is now doing as your affiant believes that Mr. Schaeffer would have
certainly communicated something in that regard to respondents, which he did not at any
time.
10. That in the event that the Division has subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant
administrative proceedings, your affiant can attest that respondents are and have been
subject to grossly competing and confScting regulation on the part of the NASD, the SEC.
and the Utah Securities Division — contradictory regulation that no business or
businessman should be required to face, let alone tolerate. In other words, the damages
respondents have sustained as a result of the instant proceedings is incalculable in that
respondents have been forced to amend all Form B-D and U-4 forms, they have had to
notify each state securities commission or division in which they do business, they have
been denied the ability to register as a broker-dealer In the State of Arizona (and as a result
lost a valuable and loyal employee), and they have had to amend several offering circulars
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they are presently underwriting to disclose and reflect the instant proceedings, disclosures
that make the completion of such offerings virtually impossible. All of this because the
Division never bothered to determine whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction and
whether the instant actions were repugnant to superseding federal law specifically enacted
to exclusively regulate respondents. Based on the foregoing, including respondent's
Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, your affiant believes that the instant
actions must be dismissed with prejudice.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this 13th day of July. 1989.
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EXHIBIT "K"

5-89

NASD Manual—Rules of Fair Practice

2013-3

"Act"

(1) The term "Act" means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
"Fixed Price Offering"

(m) The term "fixed price offering" means the offering of securities at a stated
public offering price or prices, all or part of which securities are publicly offered in the
United States or any territory thereof, whether or not registered under the Securities
Act of 1933, except that the term does not include offerings of "exempted securities" or
"municipal securities" as those terms are defined in Sections 3(a)(12) and 3(a)(29),
respectively, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or offerings of redeemable
securities of investment companies registered pursuant to the Investment Company
Act of 1940 which are offered at prices determined by the net asset value of the
securities
H 2102
Definitions in By-Laws
Sec. 2. Unless the context otherwise requires, or unless defined in this Article,
terms used in the Rules and provisions hereby adopted, if defined in the By-Laws, shall
have the meaning as defined in the By-Laws
ARTICLE III
Rules of Fair Practice
11 2151
Business Conduct of Members
Sec. 1. A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade
• • • Cross References
"Filing of Misleading Information as to Membership or Registration"
H1791
"Failure to Register Personnel"
H 1791
"Fair Dealing with Customers"
1f 2152
"NASD Mark-Up Policy"
112154
I
"Manipulative and Deceptive Quotations"
U 2155
"Policy with Respect to Firmness of Quotations"
1f 2156
" Third Market' Confirmations"
1f 2162
"Refusal to Abide by Rulings of the Uniform Practice Committee"
U 3502
"Failure to Act Under Provisions of Code of Arbitration Procedure"
113744
"Prompt Payment by Members for Shares of Investment Companies"
1(5265

"-Breakpoint* Sales"

1(5266

Annotations of selected SEC decisions
Execution and Delivery
10 Failure to Execute Customer Orders.—
In 1977, the firm acted as managing underwriter
of a registered public offering of 385,000 Jhirmack
Enterprises, I n c , secunties The underwriting
syndicate distributed 398,200 shares, resulting in
a short position of 13,200 shares when distribution
closed on March 24, 1977 Subsequently, BEHR
NASD Manual

became Jhirmack s primary market
placed quotations in the NASDAQ
March 25 BEHR began trading the
OTC market The conduct of which
plained occurred in after market
BEHR on March 25, 28, and 29

maker and
System On
stock in the
NASD com
trading by

On March 25 BEHR had customer orders to
buv 40 000 shares of Jhirmack However BEHR

Art^ 111, Sec. 1 H 2151.10

EXHIBIT "L

1402

Agency Review— § 19(c)

7-3-90

19,317

.16 AMEX was asked to correct deficiencies
Exchange, Inc (SEC 1977), 77 7 8 CCH Dec
in proposed rule changes.—American Stock fi 81,177
[H 26,294]

[Commission's Abrogation of Self-Regulatory Organization's

Rules]

I

fc
^
j
I

Sec. 19(c) The Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from (hereinafter
in this subsection collectively referred to as "amend") the rules of a self regulatory organiza
tion (other than a registered clearing agency) as the Commission deems necessary or
appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self regulatory organization, to conform
its rules to requirements of this title and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to
such organization, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title, in the following
manner

.001 Historical comment.—
The Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 16, 89 Stat 150,
amended Sec 19(c) which formerly read
"The Commission is authorized and directed to
make a study and investigation of the rules of
national securities exchanges with respect to the
classification of members, the methods or election
of officers and committees to insure a fair representation of the membership, and the suspension,
expulsion, and disciplining of members of such
exchanges The Commission shall report to the
Congress on or before January 3, 1935, the results
of its investigation, together with its recommendations " CCH
[126,295]
I

.10 Commission-initiated changes in the
rules of the self-regulatory organization —
This subsection embodies two principal changes in
existing Section 19(b) First, the SEC would be
granted the power to change the rules of a self
regulatory organization in any respect, not just
with respect to certain enumerated areas Second,
the procedures that the SEC must follow in utihz
mg this power would be clearly specified —Senate
Committee Report No 94 75 (1975), page 131
.15 Exchanges—Duty to protect investors—Reasonable diligence —See fl 21,310 37

[Notice of Proposed Rule Amendment]
S e c 19(c)

£
(1) The Commission shall notify the self regulatory organization and publish notice of
*
the proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register The notice shall include the text of the
*r
proposed amendment to the rules oi the self-regulatory organization and a statement oi the
I
Commission's reasons, including any pertinent facts, for commencing such proposed rulemakI
mg
.001 Historical comment.—
Sec 19(cXl) was added by Act of June 4, 1975,
Sec 16,89 Stat 150
[ 1 26,296]
I

[Presentations Relating to Proposed Rule Amendment]
Sec. 19(c)

*
(2) The Commission shall give interested persons an opportunity for the oral presenta
*7
tion of data, views, and arguments, in addition to an opportunity to make written submisI
sions A transcript shall be kept of any oral presentation
.001 Historical comment.—
Sec 19(cX2) was added by Act of June 4, 1975,
Sec 16,89 Stat 150
[126,297]

I
I
J
i3
I
I

[Commission Statement Concerning Rule Amendment]

Sec 19(c)
(3) A rule adopted pursuant to this subsection shall incorporate the text of the amend
ment to the ruks of the self-regulatory organization and a statement of the Commission's
basis for and purpose in so amending such rules This statement shall include an identifica
tion of any facts on which the Commission considers its determination so to amend the rules
of the self-regulatory agency to be based, including the reasons for the Commission's
conclusions as to any of such facts which were disputed in the rulemaking

.001 Historical comment.—
Sec 19<cX3) was added by Act of June 4, 1975,
Sec 16,89 Stat 150
Federal Securities Law Reports

Law § 19(c)(3) 1f 26,297

EXHIBIT "M"

bl-l-b

SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am Jur 2d Securities
Regulation — State § 18
C.J.S. — 79 C J S Supp Securities Regulation § 196

Key Numbers. — Licenses «=» I8V2 (37), Secunties Regulation «=» 272

61-1-6, Denial, suspension, or revocation of registration —
Grounds — Procedure — Examination.
(1) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities
Advisory Board, the executive director may issue an order denying, suspending, or revoking any agent, broker-dealer, or investment adviser registration
if he finds that the order is in the public interest and that the applicant or
registrant or, in the case of a broker-dealer or investment adviser, any partner, officer, or director, or any person occupying a similar status or performing
similar functions, or any person directly or indirectly controlling the brokerdealer or investment adviser
(a) filed an application for registration that was incomplete m any
material respect or contained any statement that was, m light of the
circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with respect
to any material fact,
(b) willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with any provision of
this chapter or a predecessor act or any rule or order under this chapter or
a predecessor act,
(c) was convicted, withm the past ten years, of any misdemeanor involving a security or any aspect of the securities business, or any felony;
(d) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by any court of competent
jurisdiction from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice involving any aspect of the securities business,
(e) is the subject of an order of the executive director or any predecessor
denying, suspending, or revoking registration as a broker-dealer, agent,
or investment adviser,
(f) (1) is the subject of an order entered within the past five years by
the securities administrator of any other state or by the Securities
and Exchange Commission denying or revoking registration as a
broker-dealer, agent, or investment adviser, or the substantial equivalent of those terms as defined in this chapter, or is the subject of an
order of the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending or expelling him from a national securities exchange or national securities
association registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or
is the subject of a United States Post Office fraud order
(11) The division may not institute a revocation or suspension proceeding under this Subsection (f) more than one year from the date of
the order relied on, and the executive director may not enter an order
under this Subsection (f) on the ba,sis of an order under another state
act unless that order was based on facts that would currently constitute a ground for an order under this section,
(g) engaged m dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business,
8
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(h) is insolvent, either in the sense that his liabilities exceed his assets
or in the sense that he cannot meet his obligations as they mature. However, the executive director may not enter an order against a brokerdealer or investment adviser under this Subsection (h) without a finding
of insolvency as to the broker-dealer or investment adviser; or
(i) is not qualified on the basis of such factors as training, experience,
and knowledge of the securities business, except as otherwise provided in
Subsection (3).
(2) (a) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities Advisory Board, the executive director may issue an order denying,
suspending, or revoking any registration, if he finds that the order is in
the public interest and that the applicant or registrant:
(i) has failed reasonably to supervise his agents if he is a brokerdealer or his employees if he is an investment adviser; or
(ii) has failed to pay the proper filing fee.
(b) The division may enter a denial order under this subsection, but
shall vacate the order when the deficiency has been corrected.
(c) The division may not institute a suspension or revocation proceeding on the basis of a fact or transaction known to it when registration
became effective unless the proceeding is instituted within the next 30
days.
(3) The following provisions govern the application of Subsection
61-1-6(1X1):
(a) The executive director may not enter an order against a brokerdealer on the basis of the lack of qualification of any person other than
the broker-dealer himself if he is an individual or an agent of the brokerdealer.
(b) The executive director may not enter an order against an investment adviser on the basis of the lack of qualification of any person other
than the investment adviser himself if he is an individual or any other
person who represents the investment adviser in doing any of the acts
which make him an investment adviser.
(c) The executive director may not enter an order solely on the basis of
lack of experience if the applicant or registrant is qualified by training or
knowledge.
(d) The executive director shall consider that an agent who will work
under the supervision of a registered broker-dealer need not have the
same qualifications as a broker-dealer.
(e) The executive director shall consider that an investment adviser is
not necessarily qualified solely on the basis of experience as a brokerdealer or agent. When he finds that an applicant for initial or renewal
registration as a broker-dealer is not qualified as an investment adviser,
he may by order condition the applicant's registration as a broker-dealer
upon his not transacting business in this state as an investment adviser.
(f) The division shall by rule provide for examinations, which may be
written or oral or both, to be taken by all applicants.
(4) The division may take emergency action with respect to registration
applications according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63.
(5) If the division finds that any registrant or applicant for registration is
no longer in existence, has ceased to do business as a broker-dealer, agent, or
9
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SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION

investment adviser, is subject to an adjudication of mental incompetence or to
the control of a committee, conservator, or guardian, or cannot be located after
reasonable search, the division may by order cancel the registration or application according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63.
(6) (a) Withdrawal from registration as a broker-dealer, agent, or investment adviser becomes effective 30 days after receipt of an application to
withdraw or within such shorter period of time as the division may determine, unless a revocation or suspension proceeding is pending when the
application is filed or a proceeding to revoke or suspend or to impose
conditions upon the withdrawal is instituted within 30 days after the
application is filed.
(b) If a proceeding is pending or instituted, the division shall designate
by order when the withdrawal becomes effective.
(c) (i) If no proceeding is pending or instituted, and withdrawal automatically becomes effective, the division may initiate a revocation or
suspension proceeding under Subsection 61-l-6(l)(b) within one year
after withdrawal became effective.
(ii) If the division decides to issue a revocation or suspension order,
the executive director shall enter the order as of the last date on
which registration was effective.
(7) The division, board, and executive director shall comply with the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, befqre issuing any order
under any part of this section.
J
History: C. 1953, 61-1-6, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 9; 1987,
ch. 161, § 233.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective January 1, 1988, rewrote Subsection (4) to such an extent as to make a detailed analysis impracticable; in Subsection (5)
added "according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63"; in Subsection (6) added the internal subsection designations and in Subsection (b) substituted "the
division shall designate by order when the

withdrawal becomes effective" for "withdrawal
becomes effective at such time and upon such
conditions as the division by order determines", rewrote Subsection (7) to such an extent as to make a detailed analysis impracticable, and made minor changes in style and
phraseology throughout the section
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. — The
federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, referred to in Subsection (1X0, appears as 15
U S C § 78a et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Scope of inquiry.
Commission had authority to inquire into
applicant's or registrant's conduct with respect
to unworthiness to carry on business that he or
it was registered to carry on, irrespective of

fact that securities to which inquiry was specifically directed did not need to be registered
Lauren W. Gibbs, Inc. v Monson, 102 Utah
234,129 P 2d 887 (1942) (decided under former
law)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am Jur 2d Securities
Regulation — State §§ 19 to 24
C. J.S. — 79 C J S Supp Securities Regulation §§ 223 to 226
A.L.R. — Churning stockbroker's liability
for allegedly "churning" or engaging customer's account in excessive activity, 32
A.L R 3d 635.
Law practice what activities of stock or se-

cunty broker constitute unauthorized practice
of law, 34 A L R 3d 1305
Mistake effect, as between stockbroker and
customer, of broker's mistaken sale of stock or
other security other than that intended by customer, 48 ALR3d 513
Key Numbers. — Licenses «=» 18V2 (38), 38,
Securities Regulation *=> 270, 274, 277
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SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION

successor executor or administrator which grows out of that conduct and
which is brought under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, with the
same force and validity as if served on him personally. Service may be made
by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the division, but it is not
effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a suit, action, or
proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the service and a copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant or respondent at his last known
address or takes other steps which are reasonably calculated to give actual
notice, and the plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with this subsection is filed
in the case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within such
further time as the court allows.
(8) When process is served under this section, the court, or the executive
director shall order such continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant or respondent reasonable opportunity to defend.
History: C. 1953, 61-1-26, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 36.
Cross-References. — Corporations doing

business in state to have resident agent, Utah
Const Art. XII, Sec 9

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
^
.
Foreign contracts.
In personam jurisdiction.

method of acquiring jurisdiction over one in
violation of the Securities Act, but simply gives
.
'
!
c ,
x
*, s p e c ' a l m e a n s f d o , n * » ' x t dfs n o t P r e v e n t
the obtaining of personal jurisdiction by any
other means provided by statute and, in particul
does not
l u d e t h e u s e o f § 78 _ 27 -22,
tSh e „{
a r m gtatute „ Piantes y H
den.
^ n e , IncJ , 30
514 P2d
, Utah
J ^ 2d
c TT110,
o one
n^ a 529
n*
/irV7CM
( 9 3)
* * ' " I * Jf™™o
Y
i
f ?,l
1599 39 L E d 2d 893
'
' shearing denied, 416
^
^ g ^ ^
^ L ^ ^
^
u g
(1974)

Foreign contracts.
Act did not apply to contracts made and entered into in another state United States Bond
?
*n°3
^ 12
I T P.2d
P 9 ^758,
« rehearing
v.^
7deAm.,
80
UtahK 62,
med, 80 Utah 70, 17 P.2d 238 (1932) (decided
under former law)
under former law).
In personam jurisdiction.
Subsection (7) does not provide the exclusive
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur 2d Securities
Regulation — State §§ 17, 92.
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regulation § 198

Key Numbers. — Licenses «=» 18V2 (36); Secunties Regulation ** 271

61-1-27. Construction of chapterJ
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the
interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal
regulation.
History: C. 1953, 61-1-27, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 37.
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
553763-46b-ll, enacted by L.
1987, c h . 161, § 267; 1988, ch. 72, § 21.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted
"properly scheduled hearing after re£0*rmg
proper notice" for " h e a n n g ^ M r ^ u b s e c t i o n
(1Kb), designated the^wrtgfmg provisions in
Subsection (3)a*^Jfesent Subsection (3)(a), mserting^>rtdany order in the adjudicative profig issued subsequent to the default or-

63-46b-12

der," and added Subsectiojj&ibHtTunc), designated the existirjgHJTTJtfision in Subsection (4)
nsection (4)(a), adding "In an adIcative proceeding begun by a party that
has other parties besides the party in default,"
and added Subsection (b), and made minor stylistic changes
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch 161,
^ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988

63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule.
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party.
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the
response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties
and to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the
agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other
filings, or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on
review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
733
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STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(vn) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties, and
(vm) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review
History C. 1953, 63-46b-12, enacted by L.
1987, ch~ 161, 0 268; 1988, ch. 72, * 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the
former introductory paragraph in Subsection
(1) as present Subsection (l)(a) substituting
" 3 0 d a \ s for ten davs" in that paragraph and
redesignated former Subsections (l)(a) to (d) as

^ttiMbb-U

present Subsections (l)(b)(i> to (iv), inserted "or
within the time period provided by agency
rule, whichever is longer" in Subsection (2),
and made minor stylistic changes
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch 161,
^ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988

Agency review — Reconsideration;

(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for wjfach
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-4^15-12 is
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute fin#l agency
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideratHMi with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing ofJtne request is not
a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the onier
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed wit)i the agency and one
copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request.
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue
a written order granting the request or denying the request
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does
not issue an order within 20 days aftei/the filing of the request, the
request for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied
History: C 1953, 63-46b-13, enacted by L
fating the specific grounds upon which relief
1987, ch 161, § 269; 1988, ch. 72, * 23.
' i s requested", deleted "or the order on review"
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-/ at the end in Subsection (l)(b) and substituted
ment, effective April 25,1988, subdivided Sujj
"reconsideration" for "rehearing" in Subsection
section (1) and rewrote Subsection (lKa), wf]
(3)(b)
had read "Within ten days after the date/
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch 161,
an order on review is issued, or within ten days
** 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
after the date that a final order is issued for
1988
which agency review is unavailableyany party
may file a written request for reconsideration

63-46b-14. Judicial review
tive remedies-

Exhaustion of administra-

(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute
(2) A partVmay seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that
(al/a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative
reinedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
squired,
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust anv or all administrative remedies if
(l) the administrative remedies are inadequate, or
734
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Correlator
SECURITIES ASSOCIATIONS
and

MUNICIPAL SECURITIES DEALERS
and

Gov't Securities Brokers and Dealers
A preliminary discussion introducing the subjects covered in this division. Use it for
quick review of the high points of the detailed "compilation " of decisions, rulings and
comment following

Registered Securities Associations
Brokerelnd* °f
Dealers

^he a u t hority and criteria for the registration of associations of
brokers and dealers are set forth in Section 15A of the Exchange Act
(1f25,501 and following); the procedure for registration, however, is
governed by Section 19 of the Exchange Act flf 26,241 and following). Though Section
15A deals with registration as an affiliated securities association (1(25,631), as well as
registration as a national securities association (1f25,50l), the latter is the principal
category. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) is registered
with the Commission since 1939 as a registered securities association. (The NASD is
the only association so registered.) Registration of an association as a national or as an
affiliated securities association is effected by filing a registration statement on Form
X-15AA-1 with the SEC (fl 25,502).
^ e s t a t u t o r v criteria for registration as a national securities association are, for the most part, stated in terms of what the rules of the
association must or may not provide. For example, the rules must be designed to
protect investors, prevent fraud and foster equitable principles of trade in accordance
with specific requirements and prohibitions of the statute (f 25,591) and they may
impose no unnecessary burden on competition (fl 25,613).
The association must have compliance enforcement ability (jf 25,561) and, to the
extent applicable, requirements relating to affiliated securities associations must be
met (f25,615 and 25,621). Association rules must meet standards as to selection of
directors (1(25,589), disciplinary matters (1(25,601), fair procedure (K 25,611 and
25,675 and following), equitable allocation of dues (K 25,590), membership and association with a member (1(25,570 and 25,671—25,671F), quotations (1(25,616) and dealings with nonmember professionals flf 25,651—25,655).
Reg?™at?on

For purposes of Section 15A—other than Section 15A(g)(3) relating to standards
for membership and association with a member—municipal securities are not treated
as exempted securities (K 21,191). Broker-dealer transactions in exempted securities are
within the association's rulemaking authority only to a limited extent (K 25,661).
A registered securities association may not make rules concerning transactions by
a registered broker or dealer in a municipal security (f 25,665).
Some criteria are modified in the case of registration of affiliated associations
(1(25,631—25,645).
Federal Securities Law Report!
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Sec. 15A(b)
(2) Such association is so organized and has the capacity to be able to carry out the
purposes of this title and to comply, and (subject to any rule or order of the Commission
pursuant to section 17(d) or 19(g)(2) of this title) to enforce compliance by its members and
persons associated with its members, with the provisions of this title, the rules and regula
tions thereunder, the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the rules of the
association
001 Historical comment.—
The Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 12(2), effective
December 1, 1975, 89 Stat 127, amended Sec
15A(bX2) which formerly read
"such association is so organized and is of such
a character as to be able to comply with the
provisions of this title and the rules and regula-

[1125,570]

tions thereunder, and to carry out the purposes of
this section "
Act of August 20, 1964, Sec 7(a)(1), 78 Stat
574, deleted the semicolon at the end of para
graph (2) of Sec 15A(b) and inserted the
period —CCH

[Membership in Association]
Sec. 15A(b)

3

(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (g) of this section, the rules of the association
provide that any registered broker or dealer may become a member of such association and
any person may become associated with a member thereof

001 Historical comment.—
The Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 12(2), effective
December 1, 1975, 89 Stat 127, amended Sec
15A(bX3) which formerly read
"the rules of the association provide that any
broker or dealer who makes use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate com
merce to effect any transaction in, or to induce
the purchase or sale of, any security otherwise
than on a national securities exchange, may
become a member of such association, except such
as are excluded pursuant to paragraph (4) or (5)
of this subsection, or a rule of the association
permitted under this paragraph The rules of the
association may restrict membership in such association on such specified geographical basis, or on
such specified basis relating to the type of business done by its members, or on such other specified and appropriate basis, as appears to the
Commission to be necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors
and to carry out the purpose of this section Rules
adopted by the association may provide that the
association may, unless the Commission directs
otherwise in cases in which the Commission finds
it appropriate in the public interest so to direct,
deny admission to or refuse to continue in such
association any broker or dealer if—
(A) such broker or dealer, whether prior or
subsequent to becoming such, or

[1125,581]

(B) any person associated with such broker or
dealer, whether prior or subsequent to becoming so associated,
has been and is suspended or expelled from a
national securities exchange or has been and is
barred or suspended from being associated with
all members of such exchange, for violation of any
rule of such exchange "
Act of August 20, 1964, Sec 7(a), 78 Stat
574—575, amended paragraph (3) of Sec
15A(b), which formerly read as follows.
'the rules of the association provide that any
broker or dealer who makes use of the mails or of
any means or instrumentality of interstate com
merce to effect any transaction in, or to induce
the purchase or sale of, any security otherwise
than on a national securities exchange, may
become a member of such association, except such
as are excluded pursuant to paragraph (4) of this
subsection Provided, That the rules of the associ
ation may restrict membership in such association
on such specified geographical basis, or on such
specified basis relating to the type of business
done by its members, or on such other specified
and appropriate basis, as appears to the Commission to be necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors and to
carry out the purpose of this section,"—CCH

[Denial of Membership to Certain Persons]

[The provisions relating to denial of membership in a securities association which were formerly
contained in Section 15A(bX4) prior to December 1, 1975 are now contained in Section 15A(g) See
1f25,671--25,671K CCH]

• Regulations

1)25,570 Law § 15A(b)(2)

©1990, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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.001 Historical comment.—
For text of Sec 15A(bX5) in effect prior to
December 1, 1975, seefl25.671D 001
The provisions relating to allocation of dues
were formerly contained in Sec 15A(bX7) Prior
to amendment by the Act of June 4, 1975, Sec
12(2), effective December 1, 1975, 89 Stat 127,
paragraph (7) of Sec 15A(b) read
'the rules of the association provide for the
equitable allocation of dues among its members
to defray reasonable expenses of administration
Act of August 20 1964 Sec 7(aX4), 78 State
574, 575 redesignated paragraph (6) of Section
25,591 J

1388 4-17-90

15A(b) as paragraph (7) and replaced the semicolon at the end of the paragraph with a period —
CCH
10 Dues not to exceed reasonable expenses
and to be fairly allocated —' This paragraph
has a dual purpose First, to provide that the total
of dues assessed against the members of an associ
ation shall not exceed an amount necessary to
defray reasonable expenses of administration sec
ond, to provide that such dues shall be fairly
allocated among the members of the associa
tion "—House Committee Report No 2307
(1938), 75th Cong 3d Sess

[Rules to Promote Just and Equitable Principles of Trade]
Sec 15A(b)

(6) The rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts
and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information
with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and in
general, to protect investors and the public interest, and are not designed to permit unfair
discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, to fix minimum profits, to
impose any schedule or fix rates of commissions, allowances, discounts or other fees to be
charged by its members, or to regulate by virtue of any authority conferred by this UtJe
matters not related to the purposes of this title or the administration of the association
001 Historical comment —
For text of Sec 15A(bX6) in effect prior to
December 1, 1975, seefl25,589 001
The provisions relating to the prevention of
fraudulent acts and practices were formerly con
tamed in Sec 15A(bX8) Prior to amendment by
the Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 12(2), effective
December 1 1975, 89 Stat 127, paragraph (8) of
Sec 15A(b)read
"the rules of the association are designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable principles
of trade, to provide safeguards against unreasona
ble profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or

other charges, and, in general, to protect investors
and the public interest and to remove impedi
ments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market and are not designed to permit
Unfair discrimination between customers or issu
ers, or brokers or dealer, to fix minimum profits,
to impose any schedule of prices, or to impose any
Schedule or fix minimum rates of commissions,
allowances discounts, or other charges '
Act of August 20, 1964, Sec 7(aX4), 78 Stat
574, 575, redesignated paragraph (7) of Section
l5A(b) as paragraph (8), and replaced the semicolon at the end of the paragraph with a period —
CCH

• • • Annotations by Topic
Committee report
10
Compensations for transactions in tax exempt bonds
30
Constitutionality
"Void for vagueness"
60
Construction of rule
12
Deficiencies in books and records—Rule violations,
options
126
Distribution to another broker-dealer
23
Enforcement of NASD rule by exchange
41
Excessive mark-ups
25, 27
Failure to remit dividend
16
Failure to supervise
125, 17, 18
Hot issue offerings—NASD interpretation
232
"In and out" privilege—NASD interpretation
122

Payments to another broker-dealer
20
Private cause of action—
NASD violation
5
Procedure
Collateral attack
123
Judicial refusal to enforce NASD rule
145
Motion for discovery
146
Sanctions
124
Stay of jurisdiction
15
Subject matter jurisdiction
14, 141 24
Temporary restraining order denied
13
Proposed amendments to NASD by laws
11
Proposed tax shelter rules
120
Sanction upheld
121 1211
SEC hearmgs on NASD anti reciprocal rule
35
Waiver of compliance with Act—Effect
148

.09 Scope of self-regulatory authority—1975
amendments.—

Under the bill the scope of the rule making
authority and responsibility of all self regulatory
organizations would be defined in terms of pur

1125,590.10 Law § 15A(b)(6)

©1990, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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[1125,601]

18,601

[Discipline of Members]

Sec 15A(b)
(7) The rules of the association provide that (subject to any rule or order of the
Commission pursuant to section 17(d) or 19(gX2) of this title) its members and persons
associated with its members shall be appropriately disciplined for violation of any provision
.3
of this title, the rules or regulations thereunder the rules of the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, or the rules of the association by expulsion suspension limitation of
activities, functions, and operations fine censure being suspended or barred from being
associated with a member, or any other fitting sanction
ciation of Securities Dealers would be delegated
001 Historical comment —
For text of Sec 15A(bX7) in effect prior to inspection enforcement and other responsibilities
by the bill Accordingly, this section of the bill
December 1, 1975, seefl25 590 001
would effect the changes in section 15A necessary
The provisions relating to discipline of members to implement the purposes of the bill
were formerly contained in Sec 15A(bX9) Prior
to amendment by the Act of June 4, 1975, Sec
To broaden the NASD s responsibility and
12(2), effective December 1, 1975, 89 Stat 128, authority with respect to its members which are
paragraph (9) of Sec 15A(b) read
engaged in a municipal securities business this
"the
rules of the association provide that its section of the bill would amend various provisions
m
ir,e ^rs and persons associated with its members of section 15A Specifically, paragraph (7) of sec
shall be appropriately disciplined by expulsion, tion 15A(b) would be further amended to require
suspension, fine, censure, or being suspended or that members and persons associated with its
barred from being associated with all members or members shall be appropriately disciplined for
any other fitting penalty, for any violation of its violations of the rules promulgated by the Munici
pal Securities Rulemaking Board
rules "
Act of August 20, 1964, Sec 7(a), 78 Stat 575
Similarly, the traditional requirement that the
576, amended redesignated paragraph (9) of Sec
association provide fair and orderly procedures for
15A(b), which formerly read as follows
the discipline of members and persons associated
"the rules of the association provide that its with members referred to in section 15A(b) would
members shall be appropriately disciplined, by be amended to extend these due process require
expulsion, suspension fine, censure, or any other ments in instances of violation of the rules of the
fitting penalty, for any violation of its rules * — Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Further
CCH
any final disciplinary action taken by the associa
10 Expulsion from NASD—Revocation of tion for such violations would be subject to review
registration—Free riding—The expulsion of a by the Commission in accordance with the proce
broker-dealer from the NASD membership, and dures prescribed in section 15A(h)
the revocation of the registration of the member s
The bill would also further amend subsection
president as a registered representative for viola
15A(e) of the Act to change the definition of the
tion of NASD rules (Article in, Section 1, NASD term non member for purposes of the authority
Manual G 23-4) against free riding was upheld by granted to registered securities [association] to
the SEC The president sold 500 shares of com
prohibit members by rule, from dealing with non
mon stock, out of a 2,000 share participation in an members except at the same prices and on the
underwriting of a public offering of such stock, to same terms and conditions as are accorded to the
his wife —A J Gabriel Co, Inc, and Aaron J general public Since the self regulatory organiza
Gabriel (1965), 42 S E C 755, '64 '66 CCH Dec tion created for the municipal securities industry
1177,283
by the bill the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
15 Contractual plana—"In-and-out" privi- Board, would not be a membership organization
the revision to this important provision of the Act
lege—NASD interpretation.—See f 25,591 122
would effectively require all nonbank municipal
20 NASD Disciplinary hearings—Due pro- securities dealers which participate in underwnt
cess requirements—Sanctions and costs— ing syndicates to join the NASD In this connec
Imposition ot\ tuccesiot member—Cotzm tion, syndicate and underwriting practices and
(1974), Release No 34-10850, June 12, 45 S E C the granting of any discounts, allowances or con
575, 4 SEC Docket No 12, p 420, 73-74 CCH cessions would be the subject of direct rulemaking
Dec If 79,827
by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
.50 Members engaged in municipal securi—Senate Committee Report No 94 75 (1975),
ties business—1975 amendments.—
page 112
Further changes in section 15A are necessitated
60 Burden of proof —The NASD s imposition
by section 12 [now 13] of the bill establishing the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board and pro- of sanctions against a broker did not require
viding for regulation of the municipal securities reversal simply because the NASD did not apply
industry As the only securities association regis- a "clear and convincing" standard of proof since a
tered pursuant to section 15A, the National Asso- preponderance of the evidence test was suffi
Federal Securities Law Reports
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EXHIBIT "Q"

[ H 25,139]

Comummotion of Securities Tronsoctions by
Brolcef-Cfeolers When Trading Is Suspended
Release No. 34-7920. July 19. 1966. 31 F. R. 10076.

JB ) The relemse below h fated on the Uw in effect prior to the Securities Acts Amendments
ofJ975.Sec. 12(k)st 123.371 consolidates former Sections 15<cX5) *nd 19(*X<) See 123.371.10.
CCH
17 C F R 2 4 1 . 7 9 2 0 .

The Securities and Exchange Commission today made public a jwhey statement of
its Division of Trading and Markets relating to the post-suspension consummation of
securities transactions entered into by brokers and dealers before the Commission
suspended trading in the security pursuant to Section I5(cX5) or Section 19(aX4) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
The text of the statement, issued by Irving M. Pollack, Director of the Division,
foliows:
"A number of questions have been presented recently as to whether, during the
period when trading is suspended by order of the Commission pursuant to Section
15(cX5) or Section 19(aX*) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a broker or dealer
may complete (e.g., by payment or delivery) an agency or principal contract entered
into prior to the suspension.
"It is the position of the Division that where the broker or dealer is himself acting
in good faith, where he is not connected with the activity announced by the Commission as a basis for suspension pursuant to Section 15(cX5) or Section 19(aX4). and
where he has no reason to believe that his customer is so connected, no objection need
be raised under such sections because the broker-dealer completes his contractual
obligations in the particular transaction (e.g., by payment :br delivery) while the
suspension is still in effect. The Division believes that in each such case, however, he
should inform his customer, prior to consummating the transaction, that trading in the
security is suspended and of the reasons announced by the Commission for suspending
trading.
44
A broker-dealer, in deciding whether to consummate such a transaction, must of
course consider not only the provisions of Sections 15{cX5) and 19(aX4) but also all
other applicable provisions of the Federal securities laws/*
[Release No. 34-7920. July 19,1966,31 F. R. 10076.J
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EXHIBIT "R"

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 65B

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am Jur 2d Injunctions
N 10, 14, 48 to 52, 69 et seq , 265, 296 to 303,
310 to 316
C.J.S. — 43 C J S Injunctions ^ 8, 16, 22 to
24, 36 et seq ; 43A C J S Injunctions ^ 165,
166, 180, 206, 208
A.L.R. — Infant's employment contract, enforceability of covenant not to compete in, 17
A L R 3d 863.
Appealability of contempt adjudication or
conviction, 33 A L R 3d 448
Review other than by appeal or writ of error,
contempt adjudication or conviction as subject
to, 33 A L R 3d 589
Propriety of permanently enjoining one
guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from
engaging in sale or manufacture of device in
question, 38 A L R 3d 572
Propriety of injunctive relief against diver-

sion of water by municipal corporation or publie utility, 42 A L.R.3d 426
Preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent, correct, or reduce effects of polluting
practices, 49 A L R 3d 1239
What constitutes fraud or forgery justifying
refusal to honor, or injunction against honoring, letter of credit under UCC *} 5-114(1), (2),
25 A L.R.4th 239
Recovery of damages resulting from wrongful issuance of injunction as limited to amount
of bond, 30 A L R 4th 273
Right of employee to injunction preventing
employer from exposing employee to tobacco
smoke in workplace, 37 A L R 4th 480
Propriety of federal court injunction against
suit in foreign country, 78 A L R Fed 831
Key Numbers. — Injunction «=> 9 et seq ,
143, 148, 150, 189, 190, 204, 213.

Rule 65B. Extraordinary writs.
(a) Special forms of writs abolished. Special forms of pleadings and of
writs in habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and
other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are hereby abolished. Where
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by
appropriate action under these rules, on any one of the grounds set forth in
Subdivisions (b) and (f) of this rule.
(b) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted:
(1) where any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, or an office in a
corporation created by the authority of this state; or any public officer,
civil or military, does or permits to be done any act which by the provisions of law works a forfeiture of his office; or an association of persons act
as a corporation within this state without being legally incorporated; or
any corporation has offended against any provision of the law, as it may
have been amended, by or under which law such corporation was created,
altered or renewed; or any corporation has forfeited its privileges and
franchises by nonuser or has committed an act amounting to a surrender
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges and franchises or has
misused a franchise or privilege conferred upon it by law, or exercised a
franchise or privilege not so conferred; or
(2) where an inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; or
(3) where the relief sought is to compel any inferior tribunal, or any
corporation, board or person to perform an act which the law specially
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; or to compel the
admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully excluded by such inferior
tribunal or by such corporation, board or person; or
(4) where the relief sought is to arrest the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board or person, whether exercising functions judicial or
229
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ministerial, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person.
(c) Action by attorney general under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule.
The attorney general may, and when directed so to do by the governor shall,
commence any action authorized by the provisions of Subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule. Such action shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah.
(d) Action by private person under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. A
person claiming to be entitled to a public or private office unlawfully held and
exercised by another may bring an action therefor. A private person may
bring an action upon any other ground set forth in Subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule, only if the attorney general fails to do so after notice. Any such action
commenced by a private person shall be brought in his own name. Upon filing
the complaint, such person shall also file an undertaking with sufficient sureties, in the same form required of bonds on appeal under the provision of Rule
73 and conditioned that such person will pay any judgment for costs or damages recovered against him in such action.
(e) Nature and extent of relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
Upon the filing of a complaint seeking relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this
rule, the court may require notice to be given to the adverse party before
issuance of the writ, or may grant an order to show cause why such writ
should not be issued, or may grant the writ without notice. If the writ is
granted, it shall be directed to the inferior tribunal, board, or officer, or to any
other person having the custody of the record or proceedings, commanding
such tribunal, board or officer to certify fully to the court issuing the writ,
within a specified time, a transcript of the record and proceedings, describing
or referring to them with sufficient certainty; and if a stay of proceedings is
intended, requiring the party in the meantime to desist from further proceedings in the matter to be reviewed. The review by the court issuing the writ
shall not be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal,
board or officer has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board or
officer.
(f) Habeas corpus. Appropriate relief by habeas corpus proceedings shall
be granted whenever it appears to the proper court that any person is unjustly
imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty. If the person seeking relief
is imprisoned in the penitentiary and asserts that in the proceedings which
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under
the Constitution of the United States or under the Constitution of the state of
Utah, or both, then the person seeking such relief shall proceed in accordance
with Rule 65B(i). In all other cases, proceedings under this subdivision shall
be conducted in accordance with the following provisions:
(1) The complaint seeking relief shall, among other things, state that
the person designated is illegally restrained of his liberty by the defendant and the place where he is so restrained, if known (stating wherein
and the cause or pretense thereof, according to the best information of the
plaintiff, annexing a copy of any legal process or giving a satisfactory
explanation for failing so to do); that the legality of the imprisonment or
restraint has not already been adjudged upon a prior proceeding; whether
another complaint for the same relief has been filed and relief thereunder
denied by any court, and if so attaching a copy of such complaint and
stating the reasons for the denial of relief or giving satisfactory reasons
for the failure to do so.
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(2) The complaint shall be filed in the court most convenient to the
plaintiff.
(3) Upon the filing of the complaint the court shall, unless it appears
from such complaint or the showing of the plaintiff that he is not entitled
to any relief, issue a writ directed to the defendant commanding him to
bring the person alleged to be restrained before the court at a time and
place therein specified, at which time the court shall proceed in a summary manner to hear the matter and render judgment accordingly. If the
writ is not issued the court shall state its reasons therefor in writing and
file the same with the complaint, and shall deliver a copy thereof to the
plaintiff.
(4) If the defendant cannot be found, or if he does not have such person
in custody, the writ (and any other process issued) may be served upon
any one having such person in custody, in the manner and with the same
effect as if he had been made defendant in the action.
(5) If the defendant conceals himself, or refuses admittance to the person attempting to serve the writ, or if he attempts wrongfully to carry the
person imprisoned or restrained out of the county or state after service of
the writ, the person serving the writ shall immediately arrest the defendant, or other person so resisting, and bring him, together with the person
designated in the writ, forthwith before the court before which the writ is
made returnable.
(6) At the time of the issuance of the writ, the court may, if it appears
that the person designated will be carried out of the jurisdiction of the
court or will suffer some irreparable injury before compliance with the
writ can be enforced, cause a warrant to issue, reciting the facts, and
directing the sheriff to take such person and forthwith bring him before
the court to be dealt with according to law.
(7) The defendant shall appear at the proper time and place with the
person designated or show good cause for not doing so and must answer
the complaint within the time allowed. The answer must state plainly
and unequivocally whether he then has, or at any time has had, the
person designated under his control and restraint, and if so, the cause
thereof. If such person has been transferred, the defendant must state
that fact, and to whom, when the transfer was made, and the reason or
authority therefor. The writ shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form
or misdescription of the person restrained or defendant, if enough is
stated to show the meaning and intent thereof.
(8) The person restrained may waive his right to be present at the
hearing, in which case the writ shall be modified accordingly. Pending a
determination of the matter the court may place such person in the custody of such individual or individuals as may be deemed proper.
(g) When counsel appointed for petitioner. Any person filing a petition
for habeas corpus may be appointed counsel whenever the district court, upon
examination of the petition, determines that the petition is not frivolous and
that such person is financially unable to obtain representation. If the petition
for habeas corpus is frivolous, the district court shall, without further action,
dismiss the petition.
(h) When writ returnable. Any alternative writ issued by a court or a
judge thereof, may be made returnable, and a hearing thereon may be had, at
any time as such court may in its discretion determine.
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(i) Postconviction hearings.
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary or county jail under a
commitment of any court, whether such imprisonment be under an original commitment or under a commitment for violation of probation or
parole, who asserts that in any proceedings which resulted in hi.3 commitment there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution
of the United States or of the state of Utah, or both, may institute a
proceeding under this rule.
Such proceedings shall be commenced by filing a complaint, together
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the court in which such relief is
sought. The complainant shall also serve a copy of the complaint so filed
upon the attorney general of the state of Utah if imprisoned in the state
prison, or the county attorney of the county where imprisoned if in a
county jail. Such service may be made by any of the methods provided for
service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or by mailing such
copy to the attorney general or county attorney by United States mail,
postage prepaid, and by filing with the clerk of said court a certificate of
mailing certifying under oath that a copy was so mailed to the attorney
general or county attorney. Upon the filing of such a complaint, the clerk
shall promptly bring the same to the attention of the presiding judge of
the court in which such complaint is filed.
(2) The complaint shall state that the person seeking relief is illegally
restrained of his liberty by the defendant; shall state the place where he
is so restrained; shall state the dates of and identify the proceedings in
which the complainant was convicted and by which he was subsequently
confined and of which he now complains; and shall set forth in plain and
concise terms the factual data constituting each and every manner in
which the complainant claims that any constitutional rights were violated. The complaint shall have attached thereto affidavits, copies of
records, or other evidence supporting such allegations, or shall state why
the same are not attached.
The complaint shall also state whether or not the judgment of conviction that resulted in the confinement complained of has been reviewed on
appeal, and if so, shall identify such appellate proceedings and state the
results thereof.
The complaint shall further state that the legality or constitutionality
of his commitment or confinement has not already been adjudged in a
prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding; and if the complainant
shall have instituted prior similar proceedings in any court, state or federal, within the state of Utah, he shall so state in his complaint, shall
attach a copy of any pleading filed in such court by him to his complaint,
and shall set forth the reasons for the denial of relief in such other court.
In such case, if it is apparent to the court in which the proceeding under
this rule is instituted that the legality or constitutionality of his confinement has already been adjudged in such prior proceedings, the court shall
forthwith dismiss such complaint, giving written notice thereof by mail to
the complainant, and no further proceedings shall be had on such complaint.
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of authorities shall not be set
forth in the complaint, but may be set out in a separate supporting memorandum or brief if the complainant so desires.
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(4) All claims of the denial of any of complainant's constitutional rights
shall be raised in the postconviction proceeding brought under this rule
and may not be raised in another subsequent proceeding except for good
cause shown therein.
(5) [Deleted.]
(6) Within ten days after service of a copy of the complaint upon him,
the attorney general, or the county attorney, as the case may be, shall
answer the complaint or otherwise plead thereto. Any further pleadings
or amendments shall be in conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(7) When an answer is filed, the court shall immediately set the case
for a hearing within twenty days thereafter unless the court in its discretion determines that further time is needed. Prior to the hearing, the
state or county shall obtain such transcript of proceedings or court records
as may be relevant and material to the case. The court, on its own motion,
or upon the request of either party, may order a prehearing conference if
good reason exists therefor; but such conference shall not be set so as to
unreasonably delay the hearing on the merits of the complaint. The complainant shall be brought before the court for any hearing or conference.
If the court in which the complaint is filed determines that in the
interest of convenience and economy, the hearing should be transferred to
the district court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement of
complainant, the court may enter a written order transferring such case
and shall set forth in such order its reasons for so doing.
(8) In each case, the court, upon determining the case, shall enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment, in writing, and
the same shall be made a part of the record in the case.
If the court finds in favor of the complainant, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such further orders with respect to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge as the court may deem just and proper in the case.
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings, he
may proceed in forma pauperis upon the filing of an affidavit to that
effect, in which event the court may direct the costs to be paid by the
county in which he was originally charged.
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such complaint may be appealed
to and reviewed by the Supreme Court of Utah as an appeal in civil cases.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1985; March 1, 1988.)
Amendment Notes. — Former Subdivision
(g), relating to proceedings where extraordinary writs are sought in the Supreme Court,
was repealed with the adoption of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. For present provisions, see Rules
19 and 20, Utah R. App. P.
The 1988 amendment added present Subdivision (g) and deleted former Subdivision (0(5).
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal
rule covenng the subject matter contained in
this rule, except for Rule 81(a)(2), F.R.C.P.,

which applies the federal rules to proceedings
for habeas corpus
The federal statute governing remedies on
motion attacking sentence appears at 28
US.C § 2255.
Cross-References. — Corporations, Title
16
Statute of limitations for habeas corpus action, * 78-12-31.1
Statute of limitations for postconviction relief action, § 78-12-31 2.
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"S"

R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Mark J. Griffin 4329
Assistant Attorney General
115 State Capital
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(801) 538-1331
KAYCEE MCGINLEY 2187
Securities Division
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
THE REGISTRATION OF
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC.

A M E N D E D

CRD NUMBER 7578

CASE NUMBER SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF

:

THE REGISTRATION OF
MARLEN JOHNSON

t
S

CRD NUMBER 259888

S
:

A M E N D E D

P E T I T I O N

P E T I T I O N

CASE NUMBER SD-89-47AG

The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the
State of Utah ("the Division"), by and through its Director, John
C. Baldwin, upon knowledge and belief, hereby complains and alleges
as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The cause of action was investigated by the Division upon
complaints that Marlen Johnson and Johnson Bowles Company, Inc.

2
("Johnson Bowles")

have

engaged

in

acts

and

practices

which

constitute violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (Title 61,
Chapter 1, et sea., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended)

("the

Act").
JURISDICTION
1.

Jurisdiction is vested in the Executive Director and the

Securities Advisory Board of the Department of Commerce pursuant
to § 61-1-6(1) of the Act.
2.

Section 61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Executive

Director, upon approval of a majority of the Securities Advisory
Board, may by order deny, suspend, or revoke any agent or brokerdealer registration if he finds that such order is in the public
interest and the agent or broker-dealer:
(g) Has engaged in dishonest
practices in the securities business.
3.

Johnson

Bowles

is

a

securities

or

unethical

broker

dealer

duly

registered by the state of Utah under CRD registration 7578.
4.

Marlen

Vernon

Johnson

("Johnson"),

CRD

registration

259888, is a registered securities agent by the state of Utah and
principal of Johnson Bowles and acted as such at all times relevant
to this action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
5.

On or about January 1988, Johnson, acting as an agent and

principal for Johnson Bowles began effecting and attempting to
effect transactions in the securities of USA Medical Corporation,
a

Wyoming

corporation

("USA

Medical"),

whose

securities

were

3
offered and sold in the state of Utah.
6.

On or about February 16, 1989, Johnson Bowles, by and

through its agent Johnson, filed suit in federal district court to
obtain an injunction to prevent trading of in the securities of USA
Medical.
7. On March 1, 1989, in the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company,
Inc. v. USA Medical Corporation, et al. Case No. C89-157, (U.S.
District Court, Central Division) the Court found:
. that the stock of USA Medical was unlawfully
issued, has never been registered with any proper
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded
illegally.
Further, that the stock of USA Medical has been and
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price
of that stock in violation of the securities laws.
8.
(Case

On March 1, 1989, the Division issued a Summary Order,
Number

SD-89-030)

denying

the

availability

of

all

transactional exemptions from registration for the securities of
USA Medical pursuant to the authority granted to the Division in
§ 61-1-14(3) of the Act.

A copy of the Summary Order was hand

delivered to Johnson Bowles on March 1, 1989. The Order is and has
been in effect continuously since its issuance on March 1, 1989.
The Summary Order is attached hereto and made a part of these
proceedings (Exhibit A ) .
9. On March 1, 1989, the Division commenced an administrative
action to deny the availability of all transactional exemptions
from registration pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Act for the

4
securities of USA Medical (Case Number SD-89-031).

A copy of the

Notice of Agency Action and Petition was mailed to Johnson Bowles
on March 2, 1989.
10.
Executive

Upon approval of the Securities Advisory Board, the
Director

of

the

Department

of

Commerce

accepted,

confirmed and approved the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Default Order on March 27, 1989.

The Default Order denied the

availability of the transactional exemptions

from registration

contained in § 61-1-14(2) of the Act for the securities of USA
Medical, any affiliate or successor to USA Medical or any entity
subsequently organized by or on behalf of USA Medical.

A copy of

the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Order was
mailed to Johnson Bowles on March 27, 1989.
11.

On March 31, 1989, the Division caused a letter to be

mailed to Johnson Bowles restating the findings of the federal
district court and the Division's Summary Order and Default Order.
12.

On or about April 3, 1989 through April

18, 1989,

Johnson, acting in his capacity as an agent and principal for
Johnson Bowles, attempted to effect or effected transactions in the
securities of USA Medical as follows:
a.

On or about April 3, 1989 and April 13, 1989, Johnson

contacted Mr. John Dawson, a shareholder of USA Medical, to
purchase shares of USA Medical owned by Mr. Dawson.
informed

Mr.

Dawson

that

such

arrangement

would

Johnson
be

a

handwritten agreement between Mr. Dawson and a New York firm.
Johnson offered Mr. Dawson $.10 per share and instructed Mr.

5
Dawson to deliver his stock certificate to Johnson Bowles
whereupon a check for the shares of USA Medical would be given
to him.
b.

On or about April 6, 1989, Johnson purchased 12,000

shares of USA Medical for the sum of $1,200.00 from Sheldon
and Lois Flateman in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
c.

On or about April 14, 1989, Johnson purchased 18,000

shares of USA Medical for the sum of $1,800.00

from Richard

Sax in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
d.

On or about April 18, 1989, Johnson purchased 80,000

shares of USA Medical for the sum of $8,000.00 from Paul Jones
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
e.

On or about April 18, 1989, Johnson purchased 69,500

shares of USA Medical for the sum of $6,950.00 from Nick
Julian in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
f.

On information and belief, the Division believes

Johnson has purchased approximately 226,500 additional shares
of USA Medical since March 1, 1989.
COUNT I
13. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference its
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 12 as specifically
set out herein.
14.

Section 61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Division

may issue an order suspending or revoking the registration of a
broker-dealer if it finds that such order is in the public interest
and the broker-dealer:

6
(g) Has engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the
securities business.
15.

The above described sales of USA Medical shares were

sales effected without registration or exemption in violation of
Section 61-1-7 of the Act.
16.

The actions of Johnson, in soliciting and/or purchasing

the USA Medical shares during the pendency of the Division's order,
encouraged or otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7
of the Act.
17.

The above actions of Johnson, acting

on behalf of

Johnson-Bowles, in soliciting, encouraging or aiding the violation
of the Division's Order constitute violations of § 61-1-6(1)(g) of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act.

COUNT II
23. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference its
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 22 as specifically
set out herein.
24.

Section

61-1-6(1) (g) of the Act provides

that the

Division may issue an order suspending or revoking the registration
of a broker-dealer if it finds that such order is in the public
interest and that the broker-dealer "has engaged in dishonest or
unethical practices in the securities business."
25. Rule R177-6-lg(a)(3) of the Division, promulgated under
the authority of § 61-1-6(1)(g) of the Act, establishes that the

7
following acts and practices by broker-dealers constitute grounds
for suspension or revocation of registration:
"(3) Recommending to a customer the purchase, sale
or exchange of any security without reasonable grounds
to believe that such transaction or recommendation is
suitable for the customer based upon reasonable inquiry
concerning
the
customer's
investment
obj ectives,
financial situation and needs, and any other relevant
information known by the broker-dealer."
26.

Johnson

and

Johnson-Bowles,

recommended, solicited or effected

as

described

above,

for customers the sales of

securities of USA Medical which sales would necessarily involve a
violation of Section 61-1-7 of the Act.
27.

The above actions by Johnson Bowles constitute dishonest

and unethical practices within the meaning of Section 61-1-6(1)(g)
of the Act and Division Rule R177-6-lg in that transactions which
involve a violation of the Act are not suitable.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief:
1.

A finding that Johnson Bowles Company, Inc., engaged in

the acts and practices alleged above;
2.

A finding that Marlen Johnson engaged in the acts and

practices alleged above;
3.

That by engaging in the above acts and practices, Johnson

Bowles Company, Inc. be adjudged

and decreed

to be

found

in

violation of § 61-1-6(1) (g) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and
Rule R177-6-lg of the Division;
4.

That by engaging in the above acts and practices, Marlen

Johnson be adjudged and decreed to be found in violation of § 61-

1-6(1) (g) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and Rule R177-6-lg of
the Division;

act

5,

That the registration of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. to

as

a

securities

broker-dealer

be

suspended

or

revoked

accordingly.

act

6.

That the registration of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. to

as

a

securities

broker-dealer

be

this

day of July, 1989.

suspended

or

accordingly.
Dated

R. Paul Van Dean
Attorney General

Mark Z\ Griffin
Assistant Attorney General

revoked
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John c. Baldwin, Director
Patricia Louie, Director of
Registration
Securities Division
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BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OP THE DEPARTMENT OP BUSINESS REGULATION
OP THE STATE OP UTAH
IN THE MATTER OP
USA MEDICAL CORPORATION

SUMMARY ORDER DENYING
AVAILABILITY OP EXEMPTIONS
FROM REGISTRATION

FILE NUMBER ST 1619
CASE NUMBER 6D-89-030

Pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act
(Title 61, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1983) ("the
Act"), the Utah Securities Division ("the Division") has found that
this Summary Order is in the public interest.

It appears to the

Division that:
PINDING8 OP FACT
1. S.M.I., Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the state
of Wyoming on January 12, 1979.

On or about December 8, 1987,

S.M.I.,

Medical

inc.

corporation.

merged

with

USA

Corporation,

a

Utah

The surviving company is domiciled in the state of

Wyoming under the name USA Medical Corporation ("USA").

EXHIBIT. * »

2. The anti-fraud provisions contained in § 61-1-1 of the Act
prohibits (1) employment of any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud, (2) the making of any untrue statement of a material fact,
or omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading and (3) engaging in any act, practice
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person.
3.

Section 61-1-7 of the Act states that it is unlawful for

any person to offer or sell any security in Utah unless it is
registered or exempt from registration under § 61-1-14 of the Act.
4.

Offers and sales of the securities of USA have been made

in the state of Utah during the period June 1, 1988 through this
date.
A.
5.

Failure to Register Securities

A search of the Division's records indicates that a

registration statement pursuant to 5 61-1-8, S 61-1-9 or $ 61-1-10
of the Act has never been filed by USA with the Division.
B.
«•

Failure to Qualify for Exemptions from Registration
Section

transactional

61-1-14(2)

exemptions

from

of

the

Act

registration,

contains

several

including

the

exemptions commonly referred to as the "manual listing11 exemption
contained in fi 61-1-14(2) (b) and the "secondary trading" exemption
contained in § 61-1-14(2) (m) of the Act.

A

7. On or about February 17, 1989, USA filed with the Division
an application for confirmation of the availability of the manual
listing exemption pursuant to § 61-1-14(2)(b) of the Act and Rule
177-14-2b of the Division, However, the listing for USA contained
in Moody1s OTC Industrial did not contain the minimal information
required by § 61-1-14 (2) (b) of the Act and Rule 177-14-2b of the
Division.

Specifically, the listing did- not contain a profit and

loss statement for either the fiscal year preceding the date of the
balance sheet, or the most recent year of operations.

By letter

dated February 21, 1989, the Division notified USA that the filing
was incomplete and that additional information was required.
8.

Section 61-1-14(2) (m) of the Act provides a transactional

exemption for "(a]ny nonissuer transaction effected by or through
a registered broker-dealer where the broker-dealer maintains in his
records, and makes reasonably available upon request to any person
expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the security
with the broker-dealer information prescribed by the division under
its rules and regulations.«
9.

Rule 177-14-2m of the Division sets forth the exclusive

method of claiming the transactional exemption contained in { 611-14(2) (m) of the Act.

In particular the rule requires that

specific information, i.e., a ••due diligence package11 be filed with
the Division. A search of the Division's records does not reflect
that USA has ever made a "due diligence'1 filing with the Division
pursuant to Rule 177-14-2m of the Division.

QOO^*
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10.

Fraudulent Scheme to Defraud

in the matter of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. v. USA

Medical Corporation, et al. Case No. C89-157, (U.S. District Court,
Central Division) (March 1, 1989), the court found, after having*
heard testimony on the matter, that:
. . . that the stock of USA Medical was unlawfully
issued, has never been registered with any proper
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded
illegally.
Further that the stock of USA Medical has been and
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price
of that stock in violation of the securities laws.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Division hereby
issues the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
11.

Failure of USA Medical Corporation to register its

securities, or claim an appropriate exemption from registration as
provided in § 61-1-14 of the Act, is a violation of § 61-1-7 of the
Act;
12.

Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical

Corporation have been made as part of a device, scheme or artifice
to defraud in violation of § 61-1-1(1) of the Act;
13. Untrue statements of material facts and omission to state
material facts have been made in the offer and sale of the
securities of USA Medical Corporation in violation of § 61-1-1(2)
of the Act; and

(}0063
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14.

Persons engaged in the offer and sale of the securities

of USA Medical Corporation have engaged in acts, practices and/or
a course of business which has operated as a fraud or deceit in
violation of § 61-1-1(3) of the Act.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, it is in the public interest to issue the following
SUMMARY ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with the provisions set
forth in § 61-1-14(3) of the Act, that the availability of any and
all transactional exemptions contained in § 61-1-14(2) of the Act,
be and hereby are, summarily denied.
Pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Act, notice is hereby given,
that within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a written request,
this matter will be set down for hearing•
DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1989.
SECURITIES DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION

DIRECTOR
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ., No. 3639
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Petitioners
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC.. a
Utah corporation and MARLEN V.
JOHNSON.

MOTION TO REINSTATE OCTOBER
27, EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND
ORDER

Petitioners,

JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director,
Securities Division of the
Department of Commerce, State
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER.
KENT BURGON. DAVID HARDY,
MARGARET WICKENS, and KEITH
CANNON, members of the Securities
Advisory Board overseeing the
Securities Division,

CASE NO. 890906506CV
Judge Sawaya

Respondents
Petitioners, by and through their counsel, hereby move the Court for an Order
Reinstating the Court's Extraordinary Writ and Order dated October 27, 1989. an order
which would have the effect of vacating Respondents' November 1,1989, Ex Parte Order
Setting Aside Extraordinary Writ. The basis for this Motion is that the Respondents'
November 1, 1989, Counter-Petition is misleading and a misstatement of the law and the
facts. For this reason, the October 27, Writ and Order of this Court should be reinstated.
Further, the Respondents' Ex Parte Counter-Petition evidences that Respondents acted in

knowing contempt of Court on October 30, 1989, regardless of whether this Court
subsequently set the October 27, Order aside. In support of this Motion, Respondents
herewith file a Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
DATED this 2nd day of November, 1!

;oombs
Attorney for Petitioners
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 2nd day of November, 1989, (s)he
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO REINSTATE OCTOBER
27, EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND ORDER to Mark J. Griffin, Esq., Assistant Attorney General,
located at 115 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and mailed, postage prepaid to
Craig F. McCullough, Esq., Co-Counsel for Petitioners, located at 10 East South Temple,
Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133, JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director of Securities Division,
located at 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802; and to M.
TRUMAN BOWLER. Securities Advisory Board Member, located at 124 South 200 East, St.
George, Utah 84770, KENT BURGON. Securities Advisory Board Member, located at 60 East
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; DAVID E. HARDY, Securities Advisory Board
Member, located at 215 South State Street, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2309;
MARGARET WICKENS, Securities Advisory Board Member, located at 376 East 400 South,
Suite 200, Salt Lake City. Utah 84111; and KEITH CANNON, Securities Advisory Board/
Member, located at 115 South Main Street. Salt L>*kp Ctift Utah 8 j K l \ .
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Petitioners
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation and MARLEN V.
JOHNSON,

:

ORDER

:

CASE NO. 890906506CV

Petitioners,
v.
JOHN C. BALDWIN. Director.
Securities Division of the
Department of Commerce. State
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER.
KENT BURGON. DAVID HARDY.
MARGARET WICKENS. and KEITH
CANNON, members of the Securities
Advisory Board overseeing the j
Securities Division,

:
:
:

Respondents

The petitioner's motion to reinstate the extraordinary writ and order of this
Court of October 27. 1989, and having been submitted to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration; the Court having reviewed the memorandums
of the petitioner and the respondents and having considered the same and being fully
advised in the premises and good cause further appearing, hereby orders that:
1. Petitioner's motion to reinstate the extraordinary writ and order of this
Court of October 27, 1989, is hereby denied.
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2. There is no just reason for delay and this order is hereby entered as final
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this^£day of February. 1990.
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

ames S. Sawa^4udge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 13th day of February. 1990. (s)he
mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to Mark J.
Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General, counsel to the Respondents, located at 115 State
Capitol. Salt Lake City. Utah 84114; and Kathleen C. McGinley. Esq.. Director of
Broker-Dealer Section. Division of Securities. Department of Commerce. Heber M. Wells
Building, located at 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box
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